VERMONT HISTORY

THE VERMONT HISTORICAL SOCIETY • VOL. 63, NO. 3 • SUMMER 1995

IN THIS ISSUE

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The Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society

SUMMER 1995

VOL. 63, NO. 3

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(ISSN 0042-4161)

Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in *Historical Abstracts* and *America: History and Life.*

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Vermont History: The Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society, published four times a year, in January, April, July, and October, by the Vermont Historical Society, whose offices, library, and museum are located in the Pavilion Building, Montpelier, Vermont. Second-class postage paid at Montpelier, Vermont.

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No Parking: Vermont Rejects the Green Mountain Parkway

The Green Mountain Parkway was a classic New Deal proposal, born of developments in federal and state public works programs. It also belonged to a relatively new but growing tradition of conservation and recreation philosophies. It directly reflected how states and local communities could be influenced (or resist being influenced) by movements at the national level.

By HANNAH SILVERSTEIN

On Town Meeting Day 1936, record numbers of voters crowded meeting halls across Vermont. The issue drawing so many citizens to the polls was the referendum to decide the future of the Green Mountain Parkway, the scenic mountain road that boosters had envisioned running from the Massachusetts border all the way to Canada. In a day of heavy voting, Vermonters turned down the proposal to construct the road, and so ended three years of impassioned debate. Vermonters on all sides had used the plan to focus on the most controversial topics of the times, which ranged from conservation policy to un-

employment, from the role of the federal government in state affairs to the aesthetics of the wilderness. Although in the end the parkway proposal had less effect on the state than did the urgent problems of the Great Depression, at the time there seemed to be no greater issue than the road itself.

Why did a plan to build a road cause such an uproar? To many Vermonters, the parkway battle symbolized the complexities and mixed feelings generated by the New Deal as a whole. The issue thus serves as a window through which we can examine the impact of new social policies on a small and politically conservative state. In many ways the Green Mountain Parkway was a classic New Deal proposal, born of developments in federal and state public works programs. It also belonged to a relatively new but growing tradition of conservation and recreation philosophies. It directly reflected how states and local communities could be influenced (or resist being influenced) by movements at the national level.

The Federal Context

The New Deal created an enormous federal bureaucracy whose agencies organized projects that combined employment, recreation, transportation, and conservation. The National Planning Board (NPB) was established in 1933 to orchestrate the numerous levels of bureaucracy.[1] The NPB encouraged development of similar organizations at the state level and often helped them in their attempts to wade through the confusing conglomeration of New Deal opportunities. Despite these efforts to coordinate federal interests with agencies on a smaller scale, the federal government could easily lose sight of the wishes and needs of local communities.

A key factor of New Deal policy that Vermonters encountered was the question of conservationism: what priorities should the nation and Vermont set for land management? Those who decide public conservation policy have always struggled with the central problem of keeping public lands accessible without jeopardizing the goals of preservation that make those lands worth visiting. This conflict has affected the shape and organization of the National Park Service from the time of its founding in 1916. The Park Service has never reached a comfortable balance between preservation and access, and throughout the 1930s the tension was heightened in part because the dramatic increase in federal conservation projects made the issue more pressing.

Several factors contributed to the New Deal emphasis on projects meant to improve public lands. In the face of the collapsed stock market and failing industry, unemployment during the depression era reached ter-

rifying proportions. Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration, declaring that the federal government would take responsibility for the welfare of the people, needed to find ways to employ the masses of skilled and unskilled laborers. Furthermore, as a major landholder in his own right and later as governor of New York, Roosevelt had demonstrated his concern about the declining productivity of American croplands and the fragile condition of forestlands. Government, he believed, had a role to play in preserving and improving these important natural resources. Through the creation of programs like the Civilian Conservation Corps and agencies like the Works Progress Administration, Roosevelt and his advisers found ways to put people to work on the land, thereby addressing problems of unemployment and conservation.[2]

Another element that contributed to the rising public interest in conservation policy had less to do with the economy than with popular culture. Throughout the early part of the twentieth century, the amount of leisure time available to Americans expanded. Planned recreational activities and the spaces in which to pursue them became more important to the general population. In contrast to their Puritan ancestors, twentieth-century Americans held their spare time sacred, not to be filled with work. As columnist William H. Upson wrote in 1934, "We have . . . large cities filled with people who want to go on vacations. . . . Year by year, even in spite of the depression, a greater number of people are taking more and longer vacations at a greater distance from home."[3]

The Great Depression did not slow the recreation movement. In fact, New Deal planners saw great potential for boosting the economy by developing tourism and recreation, and the Roosevelt administration responded to the nation's growing addiction to leisure by increasing the number of national parks and recreation areas and helping fund state projects for recreational purposes. In 1936 the National Resources Committee reported that revenue generated from manufacturing had gone down about 50 percent from 1919 to 1933, whereas the money spent on recreation increased from $115 million in 1917 to $400 million in 1935. The committee called recreation "the salvation of many rural areas and smaller cities."[4] In rural states such as Vermont, for example, tourism seemed to be a stable business compared to other prime resources. In 1929 Vermont earned twice as much from its recreation industry as it did from its rock quarries, and income from tourism nearly equaled the revenue from dairy production.[5] Thus there were powerful incentives for Vermont to focus its planning energy on the development of recreation.

The proliferation of automobiles among a wide segment of the population had a dramatic effect on recreation. Areas that had been accessible only to the few brave or wealthy enough to attempt to reach them were

now within driving distance of anyone who owned a car. American society during the 1930s was more mobile than it had ever been, despite the hard times, and that mobility was increasing. Because road building could potentially employ people from all backgrounds and with many different skills, the government actively encouraged projects that combined the dual needs of transportation and recreation. According to the National Resources Planning Board, "recreation accounted for 60 percent of road use in the United States in 1933."[6]

Much of this recreational driving was done on parkways, roads specifically designed to be scenic.[7] New York was the first state to explore the possibilities of such roads, building the Bronx River Parkway in 1907. By 1922, counties across New York were modeling their recreational development on the Bronx River Parkway, which was an enormous success. The parkways of New York in turn set the standard for scenic roads constructed throughout the country during the 1930s. The parkway seemed to many to be a logical extension of the concept of the public park, which was, ideally, accessible to everyone. The parkway met modern recreation needs and as such was highly attractive to New Deal planners, who were concerned with bringing rural states such as Vermont into the industrialized, technologically advanced twentieth century. The Blue Ridge Parkway connecting Shenandoah National Park in Virginia to the Great Smoky Mountain National Park in Tennessee was the first major project the Roosevelt administration funded; it has been called the epitome of New Deal projects, utilizing "all the prominent New Deal agencies," including the Public Works Administration, Works Progress Administration, National Park Service, Bureau of Public Roads, Civilian Conservation Corps, and Resettlement Administration.[8]

The parkway concept was modern, simple, and sanctified by the federal government, making the idea attractive to state leaders in Vermont. It was the newest thing in highway design, a symbol of advancement beyond pure necessity: Americans could afford to build a road for aesthetic pleasure alone. To highway planners, it was not simply the landscape but the road itself that was scenic. They considered the parkway an artistic expression seeking to create harmony between the natural world and human constructions; roads were to be "rhythmical in alignment and profile," not "the stiff lines of curves and tangents . . . found in general highway work."[9] The highway in Figure 1 was designed to handle increased use and mitigate safety hazards. It was also intended to be more beautiful, a feature noted prominently but matter-of-factly on the drawing. By eliminating roadside billboards, skirting the eyesores of industrial cities, diverting the flow of traffic into open areas, and producing a continuously flowing line in the highway, the designer added an aesthetic



FIGURE 1. *Drawings to illustrate the principles and advantages of "modern highway design." From National Resources Committee,* Regional Planning: Part III—New England *(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1936).*

dimension to the plan. Based on the assumed need to balance nature and society, this was a rather practical aesthetic. The designer would have been surprised by a view that considered all highways, with their pavement and carbon monoxide fumes, to be inherently ugly.

VERMONTERS

The peculiar character of Vermonters played a large role in their reaction to federal plans. Vermonters could be stubborn and self-contained in their politics as well as their personal lives.[10] They were cautious of outsiders and clung to old traditions. Many out-of-staters felt that entering Vermont was like stepping back in time, and publicity agents played up this nostalgia to attract tourists to the state.

In 1937 the Writers' Project of the Public Works Administration completed its guide to Vermont. Like its companion volumes in the American Guide series, the book attempted to characterize the state and its residents for a wide national audience. A number of Vermont authors, including Dorothy Canfield Fisher, contributed to the book, which reflects how Vermonters perceived themselves and wished to be perceived from the outside. Fisher proudly declared Vermont to be old-fashioned, almost a museum or a national park "representing the American past." It was an old-fashionedness, exemplified in people like the Green Mountain Boys and Calvin Coolidge, that came from an enduring spirit of independence yet had a practical edge: while the rest of the nation bounced from fads back to tradition and to the next new fad, Vermont held firm to old values that worked.[11]

The guide mentioned how "in 1936, Vermont gained national notice by declining the Green Mountain Parkway."[12] Though the Writers' Project declined to pass judgment on the state's rejection of another New Deal proposal, the authors saw in the event aspects of "that spirit of independence which has brought [Vermont] both great praise and great obloquy, but which has always, whatever the issue, been the dominating force behind its history."[13]

Tourism was becoming increasingly big business in Vermont by the 1930s. The state was fortunate in that it did not have to create artificial attractions to win visitors; in an era of industrialization, Vermont marketed its own lack of development. In 1931 the Vermont Bureau of Publicity launched a campaign to attract tourists to the state, selling Vermont with the motto "Vermont, a state unspoiled." Governor Stanley C. Wilson, who became an early advocate for the parkway in 1933, made a series of speeches to this effect, with titles such as "Vermont—A Vacation Land" and "Vermont—A Tourist's Paradise." In one address he told the audience, "Don't forget that while we have our industry and our agriculture and

are endeavoring to strengthen and expand them both along proper lines, we propose to preserve to Vermont her natural beauty."[14] Yet the state government's resolve to keep Vermont "unspoiled" could be shaken by a good proposal for development.

The Green Mountains, the most prominent feature of Vermont's landscape, have long played a role in its politics, culture, and economy. Running on a north-south axis the entire length of the state, the mountains form a physical (and psychological) barrier separating eastern and western Vermont. The highway the federal government planned to build would have accentuated this barrier, and the potential divisiveness of the proposed road was a major argument against it. With the fear of division came the worry that Vermonters would not be able to control that split. A front-page editorial in the *Rutland Herald* warned, "The state will be split in half, into East Vermont and West Vermont, with a wide strip of U.S. territory in the middle, which Vermonters can cross only with the permission of the Federal government."[15] Vermonters, already aware of their regional differences, wanted to be unified. They united around their distrust of the federal government.

Vermonters had a love-hate relationship with the New Deal. Many failed to see the purpose of the emergency measures the government was using to meet the economic crisis of the depression. When times got bad, Vermonters' solution was to hunker down and wait for conditions to change. Vermonters took longer to acknowledge the existence of the depression in part because the state's economic problems did not seem as dramatic as they did in other regions of the country. Banks in Vermont did not begin to fail until 1933, a year after Roosevelt had declared the national bank holiday to slow down the epidemic of bank failures. If Vermont seemed to be doing all right in the 1930s, it was because the state had always been poor; Vermont "was falling from a lower rung in the economic ladder."[16] When the economic crisis finally reached Vermont, though, it hit with a vengeance that made even the most skeptical Republicans think hard about the potential benefits of a welfare state.

In spite of their reluctance to recognize an emergency, for the most part Vermonters welcomed with open arms the relief packages the federal government offered. No one argued that the state was poor or that its infrastructure was outdated and crumbling. Unpaved roads still connected many Vermont farmers to the towns where they bought supplies and sold their products. Measures were needed to control the spring floods, which in 1927 had caused enormous damage throughout the state, as they would again in March 1936.[17] By 1933 the state's major industries, dairy farming and quarrying, were rapidly declining.[18] Because politics in Vermont has always been practical, the state government unhesitatingly ac-

cepted assistance through work relief programs such as the Public Works Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps.

Federal programs required states to have project proposals ready before they received money, thus Vermont had to be well organized, anticipating federal legislation before it was passed and having proposals ready immediately so the state could get as large a portion of the relief packages as was legally possible. For example, the Public Works Administration was created in June 1933. In July Governor Wilson called a special session of the state legislature in order to form an agency to help Vermont coordinate with federal relief agencies. This was the beginning of the State Planning Board (although it would not take on that name until the following year). As a result of this prompt action, by December 1933 "over three quarters of a million dollars of PWA money had been spent in Vermont," proving that "Vermonters were not backward in asking for assistance in the construction of public works."[19] Vermont's commissioner of forestry, Perry H. Merrill, asserted that "instead of the four [CCC] camps which she would have received had she not been prepared, thirteen were allotted to the Green Mountain State."[20] If money was available, Vermont was going to get it. Still, it seemed to many Vermonters that accepting federal doles was striking a deal with the devil, and some feared that in exchange for short-term assistance, Washington would undermine Vermont's independence, taking control over areas of life Vermonters held sacred.

These, then, were the elements—the economic conditions of the Great Depression, the growth of the tourist industry and the development of modern forms of recreation, and the political and social character of Vermont—that contributed to one of the biggest controversies the state faced in the early part of the twentieth century.

The Parkway Proposed

The parkway proposal was intended to connect the interests of the federal government with the needs of Vermont. The plan was to take advantage of relief assistance of $18 million available to Vermont for a large-scale comprehensive public works project under the National Industrial Recovery Act. The proposal called for a 250-mile road along the length of the Green Mountains to be flanked by strips of protected parkland 1,000 feet wide; it would connect approximately 1 million acres already designated as state parks, including the newly created Green Mountain National Forest. An enormous wilderness park would be set aside at the parkway's northernmost end. All the state government had to do was acquire, at the cost of $500,000, approximately 50,000 acres of land for the right-of-way.

FIGURE 2. *Green Mountain Parkway Reconnaissance Survey, 1934. Prepared by the National Park Service, Eastern Division, Branch of Plans and Design.*

It was a grandiose idea (or "scheme," as its opponents referred to it) requiring miles of adjacent hiking and bridle trails to accompany the road, which was to be built according to the most modern highway technology. Designed to highlight the diverse features of the Green Mountains, the road would cover a great variety of terrain. At Glastenbury Mountain in the south and Killington Peak in central Vermont, the road was to achieve an elevation of 3,500 feet. It would reach its lowest point, below 500 feet, as it crossed the Winooski River just east of Burlington. The parkway would have traveled through more than thirty Vermont towns.[21] Its planners maintained that it would help alleviate short-term unemployment and spur long-term growth of Vermont's tourism industry.

This was not the first time someone had raised the issue of a mountain road through Vermont, although most of the earlier ideas were on a small scale, lacking the scope and detail of the 1933 plan.[22] The new proposal, called the Wilgus Plan after its designer, was the first to state concretely the means by which a skyline road could be feasibly constructed. Colonel William J. Wilgus was a civil engineer from Buffalo, New York, whose accomplishments included the plan for Grand Central Terminal. Wilgus had a talent and passion for designing functional projects for public benefit. He considered the parkway "the only project of magnitude suited to [Vermont's] conditions, with which for all time to bring spiritual and material blessings to her own citizens and those of the country at large."[23]

Although Wilgus was experienced in public life and skilled at presenting proposals to all kinds of people, both within the state and in Washington, D.C., he had a major shortcoming in the eyes of Vermonters: he was not native to the state, having retired to Ascutney only a few years before. Vermonters distrusted outsiders, especially those who came to the state claiming to know how to fix its problems, as Wilgus did. He described his idea in grand terms:

> Along this lofty scenic route I envisioned year-round cultural, recreational and spiritual centers, akin to those of ancient Greece, in which attractive occupations thereby offered young Vermonters would hold them to their native heath. Coupled with this transformation of Vermont from a static to a dynamic region, pulsating with renewed vigor, would go healthful opportunities for the general public, near and far, to spend their increasingly available leisure time wisely.[24]

Had they known of it, the characterization of Vermont as a "static" society in need of the spiritual centeredness of ancient Greece might have led some lifelong Vermonters to question the intentions of the well-meaning colonel. In its promotional literature the Bureau of Publicity tried to avoid this potential problem by drawing attention away from Wilgus's imme-



William J. Wilgus. From Vermont Life *2, 4 (1948): 19.*

diate background and emphasizing that "his ancestry harks back on two lines to Vermont, one having settled in Weathersfield, and the other in Cavendish, after the close of the Revolution, in which both took active parts."[25]

Wilgus's status as an adopted Vermonter did not dampen his reception at Lions and Rotary clubs. Businessmen across the state greatly admired his experience and knowledge: "his purposes are so lofty, his judgment so sound and his experience so large that he is a man to be trusted."[26] The simplicity and clarity of his project won many supporters; the day after hearing an early version of the plan, one proponent wrote to Wilgus, "Your magnificent project for a scenic highway along the skyline of our Green Mountains, with its appropriate parkification, grips my imagination and interest."[27] But at least one organization, the Green Mountain Club (GMC), gave him a different message:

Please, Mr. Wilgus,
Go back and sit down,
We've heard what you have to say;
Find some other State
Where early and late
You can talk of a wide parkway.[28]

The arguments formulated by conservationists on both sides of the debate sounded remarkably alike. All showed a deep concern for the natural beauty of Vermont and all expressed the desire to share that beauty with others. There was never a question about whether or not the Green Mountains should be preserved. Rather, the issue was how best to preserve them. Local opponents of the parkway claimed that the road would be a "gash through the mountains" and that "a great wilderness region would lose forever its charm of solitude and natural wildness. The roar of motors through these mountain fastnesses would be as a political harangue in the silent dimly-lighted aisles of a beautiful cathedral." The Long Trail and the few roads that led to the tops of specific mountains, such as the toll road up Mount Mansfield, were as much development as the region needed. "Vermont will benefit more by its hills and trails than by any motor road."[29]

National leaders of the conservation movement, among them Aldo Leopold, also voiced their opposition to the plan, and to similar ones in other states.

> There seems to be something approaching an epidemic of expensive unneeded roads invading the last remnants of wild country still available in the United States. . . . It looks as though the availability of loose public money were breaking down the last remnants of good taste and common sense in much the same way that these roads are breaking down the wilderness. I can assure you that any desire on my part to revisit the Green Mountains would be forever canceled and destroyed if your state goes ahead with this road.[30]

Robert Marshall and Harold Ickes, FDR's secretary of the interior, both expressed their concerns about the proliferation of scenic roads through previously uncut wilderness. Ickes said, "I do not happen to favor the scarring of a wonderful mountain side just so that we can say we have a skyline drive."[31]

Proponents of the parkway seemed to feel just as strongly about the preservation of the natural landscape. They asserted that development in the Green Mountains was inevitable and that the federal government would do a better job of protecting the region than would commercial interests concerned only with profits: "Would not such a parkway help to preserve during the recreational development which is sure to come

the very beauties of mountain scenery which parkway opponents fear would be destroyed?"[32] The parkway would not be a gross freeway with hot-dog stands on either side; it would be an elegantly designed, modern road surrounded by state and national parks extending its entire length. Without it, they claimed, "the exploitation of the Green Mountains [would be] an assured fact."[33]

This was, after all, a proposal sponsored by the National Park Service, the federal agency most avidly in favor of preservation. Clarence P. Cowles, a Burlington probate court judge and a founder of the Green Mountain Club, was a consistent leader in Vermont's conservation debates before and after the parkway issue. As late as the 1960s he fought to protect Mount Mansfield from the burgeoning ski industry. An enthusiastic botanist, he welcomed the coming of the National Park Service to Vermont in part because it could help preserve the state's diverse species of ferns. Cowles considered the parkway idea a "magnificent project" and confided to a friend that it "did rather take my breath away at first." He believed the Wilgus Plan would "add to the attractiveness and use of the Long Trail, and help maintain and perpetuate it."[34] Cowles lobbied hard for the proposal among the leaders of the GMC and within the state government.

The loudest voice of opposition to the parkway came from the GMC itself. Founded in 1910 on the model of John Muir's Sierra Club, the GMC is best known for building and maintaining the Long Trail, the footpath that leads over the mountains from Massachusetts to Canada, roughly along the route the new road was to take. The Long Trail had just been completed in time for the twenty-first birthday of the GMC, celebrated by passing a series of flares from one peak to the next all the way down the trail. Governor Wilson made much of the Long Trail as a tourist attraction, "a health giving and enjoyable recreational endeavor . . . worthy of consideration for a vacation that will be different from any other."[35] Although Wilson supported the Green Mountain Parkway because he believed it would bring more tourists to the state, he obviously viewed the Long Trail as a similar asset.

It is not surprising that the GMC would protest a project that could easily be seen as a threat to the purpose, if not the existence, of the Long Trail. Even among the club's leaders, however, there was disagreement over whether the parkway was antithetical to GMC goals. According to its constitution, the objective of the GMC is "to make trails and roads, to erect camps and shelter houses, to publish maps and guide books, and in other ways to make the Vermont Mountains play a larger part in the life of the people."[36] Cowles believed that the use of the word *roads* in

this context had anticipated a project such as the Green Mountain Parkway, that the parkway would "forward quite significantly the fundamental purposes of the Green Mountain Club."[37] What better way to make the mountains play a greater role in peoples' lives, he argued, than to have a road that made them accessible to all?

The club's trustees refused to be sidetracked by this argument, responding: "We think that 'roads,' as used there, is practically synonymous with 'trails.'" Automobiles and roads designed specifically for automobiles were still relatively new at the time of the GMC's founding, so perhaps Cowles was stretching the meaning of the clause. The club stated that its mission was to provide people who desired it an experience in the wilderness that they could not easily find anywhere else. A highway, with its noises and smells and the abundance of "ignorant" people it would bring to the mountains, would make such enjoyment impossible.[38]

The GMC certainly was not opposed to federal involvement in Vermont land management nor to the exploitation of forests for logging and other commercial uses. For instance, it supported the development of the National Forest Service, believing that the Department of Agriculture would better protect Vermont's forests than would private owners. With proper management, it asserted, Vermont could provide for the "perpetual production of timber." Other benefits of a well-managed forest would be better flood and erosion control. The trustees therefore encouraged the Forest Service to expand its boundaries in the Green Mountain National Forest.[39] The GMC clearly differentiated between the necessary uses for a forest and what they considered exploitation.

In 1933 the club took a hard-line position against the parkway, categorically refusing to consider endorsing its construction. At a special meeting of the trustees held in July, the GMC's leaders drew up a statement of opposition, resolving that the club was "unalterably opposed to the construction of such a highway."[40] The GMC appealed to Vermonters' thrifty nature, framing its argument in terms of the economic well-being of Vermont before discussing the club's philosophy of conservation. The issue was as much about saving money as it was about keeping Vermont "unspoiled"; although the parkway appeared to come out of federal funds, it could easily turn into an extravagance the state could ill afford. The GMC then acknowledged that its primary interest—preventing damage to the Long Trail—was slightly different from the interests of the public at large. The trustees sent this resolution to Vermont's political leaders, and news of the GMC's stance reached newspapers across the state the next day.[41]

By 1934, however, it appeared to GMC leaders that the parkway was inevitable, as both the state and federal government were taking serious

steps toward turning the project into a reality. Most significant was the reconnaissance survey of the proposed site, undertaken by a team of Vermonters as well as landscape architects and engineers employed by the National Park Service. The trustees realized that if they wanted the Long Trail to survive the road building, they would have to cooperate with the federal government. The surveyors made it clear that the GMC's input was valuable to them; after all, the club's leaders had spent the past twenty years surveying this territory, and their knowledge and opinions were based on hard-earned experience. In return the club received guarantees that the Long Trail would be relocated where necessary and that the federal government would provide the funding and labor force to do so. GMC trustees appointed Herbert Congdon to "cooperate with the state and federal authorities in trying to locate the National Parkway so as not to affect the Long Trail and also assist in the re-location of the Long Trail as agreed to by the federal commission." The club explained this change of position to its members: "While the trustees have opposed this project, and regret that their opposition has not availed to kill it, still they feel that there are several mitigating circumstances, and the result will not be as bad as was feared."[42] This was not capitulation but an attempt to make the most of an unavoidable situation. GMC leaders did not pretend to be happy about the developments. "Many lovers of the mountains and wilderness . . . will not cease to regret that this gash . . . is to be cut."[43]

This switch was short-lived, however. By September the trustees reaffirmed their former "unalterable opposition" and published a sarcastic statement about Governor Wilson, claiming he had acknowledged the group's "power to wreck this plan." A considerable amount of discussion and debate was taking place within the ranks of the club during this time. Although the GMC's shift in position had been well publicized, it was less widely known that the club's members were far from unanimous in their understanding of the issues. The official history of the GMC mentions only that the club "mounted opposition to the so-called Green Mountain Parkway."[44] Other GMC literature states that it "never faltered in its opposition" to the parkway.[45] Cowles was sarcastic about the club's self-congratulatory stance, commenting to his friend David Howe, the editor of the *Burlington Free Press:* "It is a wise man who can be 'unalterably' opposed to a debatable position, and a brave soul who cares openly to say so. Don't you think we ought to take off our hats to the trustees of the G.M.C. for that?"[46] Of course the membership could not have been in complete, "unalterable" agreement about the parkway if even the trustees' views changed during the three years of the controversy. One of them, Mortimer Proctor, was quoted as saying, "When the parkway was first proposed, I was somewhat captivated by certain spectacular phases. Con-

tact over a period of several months with all sorts of arguments, however, has placed me in the opposition column."[47]

In order for the trustees accurately to represent the view of their constituents, they polled the members. In July 1934 Wallace M. Fay of Proctor, Vermont, then the club's president, sent out ballots asking members to take a stand. Attached to each ballot was a list of seven advantages and disadvantages of the Wilgus Plan, "endeavoring to give, in a fair way, the arguments on both sides" and pointing out the parkway's impact on the Long Trail, the risk of roadside development, the possible effects on trade and tourism, the kind of visitor the parkway was likely to attract to the state, forest management and conservation issues, and potential benefits the parkway could yield for Vermont. Even Cowles complimented Fay on "the fairness with which you have set out the pros and cons of this question."[48] If anything, the ballot was biased in favor of the parkway, each of the reasons for the proposal taking up several paragraphs apiece and the reasons against it never running longer than two concise sentences.[49]

The results of the vote were disappointing and inconclusive. Only 468 out of over 1,000 members returned their ballots, and 42 percent favored the parkway.[50] Of those for the parkway, more than half were Vermonters, which meant that although more Vermonters opposed the proposal than supported it (by twelve votes), a significant number were skeptical of the club's opposition. The *Long Trail News* complained that "there should have been a larger vote." Still, this slim majority, as well as a separate trustees' vote that came out fourteen to two against the road, was considered enough of a mandate for the leadership to continue to voice opposition in the name of the GMC.[51]

This survey alone might suggest that the parkway was not as pressing an issue as activists on either side made it out to be. A majority of GMC members did not even vote, so the ones who did must have been those most concerned about the issue—although some members might have been confused by Fay's positive presentation of the proposal. When Fay sent out the ballots, the parkway seemed to be a fait accompli; members may have failed to vote because they believed neither their vote nor the actions of the GMC would affect the outcome of the issue. Two years later, though, when the proposal was brought to a state referendum, it clearly had become the major issue of the day. We can assume that at least some GMC members were active in their town meetings that year. Everyone else was.

GMC leaders recognized that simple opposition was not a good strategy where federal money was concerned, and so a committee set out to design another proposal that would fulfill the goals of the parkway with-

out endangering the mountains or the Long Trail. Early alternatives were so-called valley parkways, which would have looked much like Interstate 91 does today, with its beautiful views and easy access to towns throughout the state. Placing the road in the valleys, its advocates claimed, would encourage tourists to stop in Vermont villages and contribute to the state's economy. Many argued that the skyline highway would bypass too many towns, especially in the south, making it inconvenient for tourists to visit them.[52]

Wallace Fay's "All-Vermont Plan" was more sophisticated. Fay proposed that the federal money intended for the parkway be spent on renovating abandoned farmhouses and reconstructing the roads to get to them, with the purpose of attracting long-term visitors who, instead of exploiting Vermont for a day or two on a parkway, would live in the state, bringing in their talent and money.[53] The people who would want these "summer houses" would be the kind of people Vermont wanted to attract. Another benefit would be the general improvement of the failing infrastructure. Although Fay's plan was presented to the state's House of Representatives, it was never seriously considered.

The *Burlington Free Press,* which consistently supported the Green Mountain Parkway, strongly objected to these alternative plans. In the case of the "valley parkways," the editors claimed that the Green Mountain Parkway would not, for the most part, be along the ridges of the mountains, so the mountainsides would not be scarred. As for the people who complained that their villages would be bypassed, they were simply too shortsighted to see the long-range benefits the parkway would bring to the state.

The *Free Press* was most critical of the All-Vermont Plan, rebutting the claim that the parkway would drive away the kind of visitors Vermonters wanted to receive: "The fact is that the records indicate the year in which the parkway survey was made, and nearly everybody was talking about it, more outsiders bought property in Vermont than in any other year for which records have been kept. Is not that evidence that the prospect of the Parkway encouraged outsiders to buy summer homes in Vermont?"[54] At a hearing on the parkway held on March 8, 1935, the head of the division of public roads made the claim that it was out-of-staters with no lasting stake in Vermont who were spreading opposition to the parkway. He "had no patience with people from out of the state who buy summer places here and then object to anyone else coming in to the state."[55]

Vermonters were extremely concerned that they get their money's worth from any project funded by the federal government. Many were not convinced that a skyline drive would provide the kind of economic stimulus

needed to pull the state out of its poverty. Some resented that the aid package could not be spent more practically—on flood control, for example, or the improvement of existing highways and backroads. "Parkways would be awfully nice," a Rutland salesclerk told the *Herald*, "but they don't seem as essential as good roads and sidewalks."[56] A few suggested that the parkway be built somewhere else, perhaps in upstate New York or in the wilderness of Maine.[57]

Opponents of the parkway considered it unfair that the offer of aid should be an all-or-nothing package tied to the acceptance of a potentially damaging project, but supporters of the parkway found the alternative proposals as irritating as those of the GMC. Many favored the proposal for the sole reason that its passage would allow the state to obtain $10 million; as the *Free Press* remarked, "if our Washington Santa Claus wants to send us up ten millions to build a road over the side of our old Green Mountains, let's graciously accept it and put the boys to work."[58]

Others regarded this as poor rationale and warned that there was no guarantee that Vermont would not eventually have to shell out huge amounts of money to finish a project that the federal government began and then abandoned.[59] As it was, Vermont was to contribute $500,000, to be collected through a gasoline tax. Many Vermonters were uncertain whether the parkway would bring revenue into the state or end up costing a fortune in unrepaid maintenance costs. Much of this distrust had to do with antagonism toward New Deal legislation in general: the more involved the state became in New Deal projects, the more it stood to lose if or when the New Deal failed.

The Decision of the People

The debates grew more heated when the issue came before the General Assembly. On February 1, 1935, Governor Charles M. Smith sent the findings of the National Park Service reconnaissance survey to the Vermont House of Representatives. The governor's report informed legislators of the nature of the parkway, showed how it would fit into a broader plan of regional parkways connecting Massachusetts and New York, and assured them that it would be accessible and attractive to large numbers of people living in cities. The report went into the details of the plan, explaining that the 1,000-foot right-of-way surrounding the road, key to Wilgus's idea, would "give approximately 500 feet of forest and park land on either side of the Parkway." Moreover, "At numerous places this width will be expanded into park area including whole lakes and their shores, stream valleys and their adjacent hillsides and entire mountains or groups of mountains. . . . The present terminus of the project will be a park area of some 20,000 or more acres of complete wilderness,

including the several peaks of the Jay group and extending to the Canadian boundary."[60]

The legislature held several hearings notable for the amount of public attention they received. The first, on March 14, "drew Vermonters from every section of the state, who packed every foot of available space in the Hall of Representatives and overflowing into adjacent lobbies."[61] The *Free Press* reported that most of the audience favored the parkway.[62] The *Herald*, the newspaper most avidly opposed to the parkway, omitted mention of the reaction of those at the hearing.

The House of Representatives voted on the issue on March 26. Legislators were asked to approve the sale of 50,000 acres of land to the federal government to be used for the right-of-way bordering the highway. The *Free Press* predicted that the majority of House members would approve this resolution: "'Ninety per cent of the House now favor the Green Mountain Parkway,' remarked one of its few opponents after last Friday night's hearing in Montpelier. . . . The doubters and objectors played a useful part at first. Now it has been before the state for 21 months. Time is precious. The days of big Federal spending are limited."[63] Whatever confidence the *Free Press* may have had, the atmosphere of suspense drew a large audience to hear the House debate on the resolution: "It was a throng rivaled in numbers only by the greeting accorded Amelia Earhart and the debate was the longest on any single subject considered in regular session of either House for many legislative sessions."[64] The arguments on the floor echoed those that had been going on in public for two years. The major points concerned state versus federal rights to control taxation and land management. For the legislators, the issue was more monetary than anything else. Their decision was based upon what was best for Vermont's pocketbook.[65]

Finally, hoping to test the vote, supporters of the parkway, led by Representative Joseph H. Denny from Northfield, proposed an amendment reducing the acreage in the bill from 50,000 to 35,000; it passed 126 to 103. Supporters saw approval of the amendment as a sign that the entire resolution would pass, and so the resolution was brought to a vote soon afterward. In that vote, however, eight more legislators cast their ballots than had in the test resolution, and some changed their votes. This time the resolution failed 126 to 111.[66]

After rejecting the parkway, the representatives were pleased enough with themselves to read into the *House Journal* a favorable article from the *New York Herald Tribune.* The staunchly anti-New Deal piece praised the "hard sense" of Vermonters, saying they had "looked this particular gift-horse in the mouth and shipped him back to Washington. The whole state should be proud of their legislators."[67]

Advocates of the parkway did not give up after the 1935 vote. The *Free Press* carried an editorial claiming the defeat was "not a decisive blow" and warning that the House of Representatives had "gone against a strong popular will, even though members may feel they were representing their constituents."[68] Cowles wrote the editor of the newspaper in July 1935: "I still expect to drive my auto over the full length of the Green Mountain Parkway."[69] In the fall Governor Smith asked legislators to reconsider their decision. Instead, they turned it over to the people, asking for a referendum vote to be held on the upcoming Town Meeting Day.[70]

Vermonters rejected the parkway 43,176 to 31,101.[71] This wide margin was a surprise even to those who had worked hardest to defeat it. The *Long Trail News* reported, "The referendum vote on the parkway at the Vermont town meetings in March was not as close as expected. It was generally expected that the voters would turn down the scheme by a small majority of perhaps 3,000, but the majority against it was about 12,500."[72] The victory was somewhat confusing to the plan's boosters, who acknowledged that their defeat could work to the state's advantage. The editor of the *Free Press* wrote, "We cheerfully and without bitterness accept the verdict of the majority. . . . And, while we are still of the opinion that the Parkway would not have 'spoiled' Vermont had it been built, we fully recognize that its defeat will enable Vermont to place new emphasis on the slogan 'Unspoiled Vermont' and we feel sure the State Publicity Service will take advantage of that opportunity."[73] This graciousness did not preclude the impulse to satirize the outcome. While the *Herald* made much of Glastenbury's unanimous negative vote, the *Free Press* noted that the unity of the town's three voters "undoubtedly . . . indicates that the members of the Mattison family are still getting along reasonably well together." Still, this was as harsh as the post mortem commentary became. Parkway supporters, like good Vermonters, possessed a strong streak of realism. The *Free Press* editor summed up his notes with a practical sigh: "Well, the people have expressed their opinions in no uncertain terms. So that's that. Now we can turn our attention to other matters."[74]

Conclusion

Why did the parkway proposal fail? There is no single satisfactory explanation, which suggests that the more important question is why the parkway became a major issue in the first place. And crucial to an analysis of this question is an understanding of how those involved in the debate perceived themselves and their motives.

The debate cannot be understood as a conventional conservation battle. It is wrong to assume that the proponents of the parkway were anticonservationist simply because they favored development. Indeed, both sides

saw themselves as the protectors of Vermont's natural environment. To believe that parkway supporters cared more for development than for conservation is to take the arguments of the opponents at face value, a risky business for a historian.[75] Many if not most parkway supporters believed their position to be in harmony with their conservation values; Cowles epitomizes this attitude.

The construction of parkways in other states generated controversy but was not generally criticized as anticonservationist. In Virginia, for instance, the Skyline Drive was considered a "victory for conservationists."[76] The debate there, as in Vermont, centered on states' rights and the problem of relocating citizens who lived on lands that were reverting to federal ownership. Virginians did not worry (at least out loud) that the road would destroy the scenery of the Blue Ridge Mountains, and so the parkway was built with the full consent of the state's conservationists. It is clear that Vermont's system of government, although Vermont was as much a single-party Republican state as Virginia was a single-party Democratic state, contributed to the defeat of the Green Mountain Parkway. With its New England tradition of town meetings, Vermont relied heavily on the general public in its decisionmaking process. Local communities in Virginia had much less impact on the plans of the state and federal government.

Partisanship may have played a role in Vermonters' decisionmaking process, but despite statistical evidence for such an interpretation,[77] in the primary literature there are few direct references to party politics. Items in the press that do mention the relationship of political parties to the parkway comment on how small a role partisanship played in the issue.[78] An analysis that relies on party politics to interpret Vermonters' response to the parkway fails to take into consideration their self-perception as they went to the polls on March 3. Frank Bryan argues that statistically two Vermonters of the same occupation and economic standing but belonging to different parties would have voted differently on the parkway, whereas two Vermonters of the same party, one a granite worker and the other a farmer, would have cast the same vote.[79] This may be true. It is important to understand, however, that nobody—either at the public hearings or in the legislature or even in the press—referred to party alignment in the discussion of the parkway. Debate was focused on the issue itself. This does not mean that the political parties did not influence people's opinions but that this influence was secondary to the debate.

The division of the votes was not random: the northern part of the state supported the proposal whereas the south rejected it. The results of the referendum suggest that Vermonters were weighing the benefits of the parkway to the state against its potential effects on their local communities. In the south Vermonters tended to vote against the road in part

because the southern villages would be more easily bypassed by day-tourists who would gas up in Massachusetts, drive through the state, and stop in Burlington or somewhere up north for a bite to eat and another tank of gas. The split between north and south is especially striking if one looks at the map of towns along the proposed road. Only the two southernmost towns voted in favor of the parkway, possibly because they served as the entry point to the scenic road and to the state; tourists would be likely to stop there for information.[80]

It could be argued that the press had a measurable impact on the outcome of the referendum. The state's newspapers, especially the *Rutland Herald* and the *Burlington Free Press*, followed the debates closely, served as outlets for public opinion, and took aggressive positions on the issue. Yet it is difficult to ascertain how these actions affected the outcome, for it is equally possible that the editorial stance of each paper was determined by the editorial assessment of the public that it served. The north-south dichotomy may have played a role in determining the opinions both of the newspapers and of the body politic.

The most powerful arguments for and against the parkway dealt with issues directly related to state and local concerns. Within this framework Vermont towns were of course worried about the local effects of the parkway. The state government, for its part, was attempting to maximize benefits for the state as a whole. Although these levels of government often work together successfully, each has its own primary focus. The government in Washington had little understanding of what Vermonters in Glastenbury, with its voting population of three, wanted in the way of federal assistance.

From the perspective of the federal government, the proposed Green Mountain Parkway would have fulfilled several New Deal goals. In addition to providing short-term employment for skilled and unskilled labor, it would have satisfied conservation and recreation needs. Most attractive to the national planners, however, was the potential to expand the parkway into an even larger project that could unify the eastern seaboard. The federal government, though it attempted to be sensitive to the particular needs of Vermont, was concerned mostly with the potential breadth of the project and its impact on a national rather than a state level.

None of these considerations satisfactorily explains why Vermonters responded to the proposal the way they did. Perhaps in the end the most critical factor was the most personal and therefore the most difficult to prove: taste. Those who appreciated the aesthetics of the built environment had little trouble supporting the proposal to build a parkway intended to be scenic in both its setting and its design. Vermonters who fought and voted against the parkway could not reconcile their ideal of "unspoiled"

nature with a permanent, artificial structure. Was it selfish, as some claimed, to oppose making the Green Mountains accessible to more people? If the battle were being fought today, the opponents' arguments would be full of data about ecosystems and environmental impact, issues that concern more than the human world. These arguments were not well formulated in the 1930s. Opinions about the parkway were mediated through individual beliefs about how nature and civilization should interact. For better or worse, Vermonters decided that a scenic parkway was not the best use of their mountain landscape.

Notes

[1] National Planning Board, *Final Report, 1933-34* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1934), quoted in Philip W. Warken, *A History of the National Resources Planning Board* (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1969), 47. Marion Clawson, *New Deal Planning: The National Resources Planning Board* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). The NPB, originally designed to analyze the economic potential of the nation's resources, after several permutations became the National Resources Planning Board in 1939. Its extended powers and duties related to long-term planning of the use and maintenance of everything from land to energy to social security.

[2] John Aubrey Douglass, "The Forest Service, the Depression, and Vermont Political Culture: Implementing New Deal Conservation and Relief Policy," *Forest and Conservation History*, October 1990, 164.

[3] William Hazlett Upson, "The Green Mountain Parkway," *Informational Bulletins on State Problems* 4 (Burlington: Vermont State Chamber of Commerce, 1934), 1.

[4] National Resources Committee, *Regional Planning: Part III—New England* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1936), 50.

[5] Vermont State Planning Board and the NRB, "Graphic Survey: A First Step in State Planning for Vermont" (1935), 43. According to this report, recreation generated $25 million in revenues in 1929 compared to $10.4 million from quarrying and $29 million from dairy production.

[6] Phoebe Cutler, *The Public Landscape of the New Deal* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 53.

[7] "The Green Mountain Parkway Up To Date," *Informational Bulletins on State Problems* 5 (Burlington: Vermont State Chamber of Commerce, 1934); Cutler, *Public Landscape*, 51.

[8] Cutler, *Public Landscape*, 56.

[9] "The Green Mountain Parkway Up To Date."

[10] Richard Munson Judd, *The New Deal in Vermont: Its Impact and Aftermath* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1979), 44.

[11] Dorothy C. Fisher, "Vermonters," in Federal Writers' Project of the Works Progress Administration, *Vermont: A Guide to the Green Mountain State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1937), 3–9.

[12] Ibid., 36–37.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Stanley C. Wilson, *Vermont: A Tourist's Paradise* (Montpelier: Vermont Bureau of Publicity, 1931).

[15] *Rutland Herald*, 2 March 1936, 1.

[16] See Judd, *The New Deal in Vermont*, especially chapter 2.

[17] See Samuel Hand, "The 1927 Flood: A Watershed Event," in Samuel B. Hand and H. Nicholas Muller III, *In a State of Nature: Readings in Vermont History* (Montpelier: Vermont Historical Society, 1982). Hand discusses the emergency proceedings of the state legislature, pointing out that "the decision to reconstruct Vermont's highway system with *hard surfaced roads* ushered the motor vehicle age into Vermont considerably earlier than it would otherwise have come" (italics in the original, p. 388). For reports of the 1936 floods, see the *Rutland Herald* and *Burlington Free Press*, 5 March through the end of April 1936.

[18] "Graphic Survey: A First Step in State Planning for Vermont," 43.

[19] Judd, *The New Deal*, 37.

[20] Ibid., 38.

[21] Vermont State Planning Board, *Green Mountain Parkway: Facts About the Proposed Green Mountain Parkway and Green Mountain Parkway Acts* (1935–1936); this pamphlet includes topographical profiles and cross-sections of the parkway site. "Col. William J. Wilgus Explains Proposed Green

Mt. Parkway," *Informational Bulletins on State Problems* 3 (Burlington: Vermont State Chamber of Commerce, 1933), describes an earlier version of the plan. The notable difference in the plans between 1933 and 1935 was that the federal government increased the amount of aid it offered from $10 million to $18 million. In the 1935 session of the legislature, the amount of land to be purchased was reduced from 50,000 to 35,000 acres as part of a compromise tactic.

[22] Clarence P. Cowles introducing Wilgus at a speech, Cowles Papers, Green Mountain Club Archives, Vermont Historical Society, Montpelier.

[23] Wilgus to Cowles, 6 August 1933, Cowles Papers, GMC Archives; William J. Wilgus, "Vermont's Opportunity," *Bulletin of the Vermont State Chamber of Commerce*, August 8, 1933.

[24] William J. Wilgus, unpublished manuscript completed March 8, 1948, 240–241, Wilbur Collection, Bailey/Howe Library, University of Vermont.

[25] Wilgus, "Vermont's Opportunity." Wilgus uses almost this exact wording in an undated biographical statement among the Cowles Papers in the GMC Archives.

[26] Cowles to Captain Herbert Wheaton Congdon, 14 September 1933, Cowles Papers, GMC Archives.

[27] Cowles to Wilgus, August 1933, Cowles Papers, GMC Archives.

[28] Ella Warner Fisher quoted in *Long Trail News (LTN)*, February 1934, 3.

[29] *LTN*, September 1933, 2; the first quote is Mortimer Proctor, the second Walter P. Eaton.

[30] Aldo Leopold to the *Rutland Herald*, 2 March 1936, 9.

[31] Ickes quoted in the *Rutland Herald*, 18 March 1935. Ickes's position regarding parkways is not clear, though the report of the reconnaissance survey sent to determine the location of the parkway claims that he was "favorable" toward the proposition. "The Proposed Green Mountain Parkway," *Journal of the House of Representatives*, biennial sess., 1935, 206.

[32] *Burlington Free Press*, 12 March 1935, 4.

[33] Laurie D. Cox, "An Artistic Conception: The Green Mountain Parkway," *Informational Bulletins on State Problems* 7 (Burlington: Vermont State Chamber of Commerce, n.d.).

[34] Cowles to Wilgus, 3 August 1933; Cowles to Captain Herbert W. Congdon, 14 September 1933; Cowles to Dr. Will S. Monroe, 3 August 1933, Cowles Papers, GMC Archives.

[35] Stanley C. Wilson, *The Long Trail* (Montpelier: Vermont Bureau of Publicity, 1931).

[36] Constitution of the Green Mountain Club, 1911, Cowles Papers, GMC Archives.

[37] Cowles to Mortimer Proctor, 26 August 1933, Cowles Papers, GMC Archives.

[38] *LTN*, April 1936, 2.

[39] Minutes of GMC trustees' meeting, 24 June 1933, GMC Archives.

[40] *LTN*, July 1933, 2.

[41] *Burlington Free Press*, 14 July 1933, 2.

[42] Minutes of GMC trustees' meeting, 2 June 1934, GMC Archives. *LTN*, June 1934, 2.

[43] *LTN*, June 1934, 2.

[44] Green Mountain Club, *Guide Book of the Long Trail*, 23d ed. (Waterbury Center, Vt.: Green Mountain Club, 1992), 12.

[45] *LTN*, July 1935.

[46] Cowles to David Howe, 31 July 1935, Cowles Papers, GMC Archives.

[47] Mortimer Proctor, quoted in the *Rutland Herald*, 2 March 1936, 1.

[48] Fay to GMC members, 30 July 1934; Cowles to Fay, 6 August 1934, Cowles Papers, GMC Archives.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Because the GMC tallied membership at the beginning of each year, it would be difficult to determine exactly how many members there were in July 1934. In February 1934 the GMC had 1,084 members; in January 1935 it had 1,204 members. There does not seem to be any indication that people dropped out of the club because they disagreed with its stance on the parkway.

[51] *LTN*, September 1934, 2. Frank Bryan and Kenneth Bruno used this survey as evidence of the GMC's inconclusive statistical influence on the referendum vote of 1936, as it "indicated that much of the cry against the Parkway came from out-of-state members"; "Black-topping the Green Mountains: Socio-Economic and Political Correlates of Ecological Decision-making," *Vermont History* 41 (Fall 1973): 234. It should be pointed out, however, that in view of the small sample covered by the vote, the early stage in the debate at which this sample was taken, and the intangible influence of propaganda on the body politic, the vote simply shows the GMC's internal workings. What is more, the press and the state government (and therefore the public) at the time perceived the GMC as a major influence; in this instance perception is more critical than poorly substantiated fact.

[52] *Rutland Herald*, 2 March 1936, 2.

[53] *Journal of the House of Representatives*, biennial sess., 1935, 232–234.

[54] *Burlington Free Press*, 14 March 1935, 6.

[55] *Rutland Herald*, 8 March 1935, 1.

[56] Ibid., 19 August 1933, 8.

[57] Ibid., 12 March 1935, 8; 25 March 1935, 8.
[58] *Burlington Free Press*, 16 March 1935, 7.
[59] *Rutland Herald*, 27 March 1935, 2.
[60] *Journal of the House of Representatives*, biennial sess., 1935, 207–208.
[61] *Rutland Herald*, 15 March 1935, 1.
[62] *Burlington Free Press*, 15 March 1935, 1.
[63] Ibid., 13 March 1935, 6.
[64] Ibid., 27 March 1935, 1, 11.
[65] *Rutland Herald*, 27 March 1935, 2.
[66] *Journal of the House of Representatives*, biennial sess., 1935, 616–618. The similarity of the numbers in the first and second votes suggests that legislators who voted in favor of the compromise opposed the parkway and may have been trying to lull the proponents into thinking it was safe for them to call for a vote. This is difficult to ascertain, of course. The House called a roll for the second, determining vote but not for the "test" vote. The press failed to comment on the numerical coincidence, reporting simply that after the test vote it seemed the resolution would pass (*Rutland Herald*, 17 March 1935, 1). The only clue is that Representative Denny, who moved to change the resolution, voted in favor of the parkway (and presumably of his own compromise as well), suggesting that parkway proponents might have accounted for some of the 126 votes for the compromise and that a different 126 representatives then voted against the parkway.
[67] *Journal of the House of Representatives*, biennial sess., 1935, 709–710.
[68] *Burlington Free Press*, 27 March 1935, 6.
[69] Cowles to David Howe, 31 July 1935, Cowles Papers, GMC Archives.
[70] Bryan and Bruno, "Black-topping the Green Mountains," 225.
[71] *Burlington Free Press*, 4 March 1936, 1. These figures are described as the "complete, unofficial vote." The *Herald* for the same day records slightly different numbers. A final total had to wait for absentee ballots to come in.
[72] *LTN*, April 1936, 2.
[73] *Burlington Free Press*, 5 March 1936, 6.
[74] Ibid.
[75] But some historians have viewed the parkway debate as an issue of conservation, judging parkway opponents to be the true conservationists. Bryan and Bruno use it as a case study to predict how rural populations will vote on "clean" (clear-cut) environmental questions: "the issue was cast, molded and polished dichotomously in terms that still define the dimensions of the conflict over environmental decision-making, i.e., economic development versus preservation of ecological balances and the integrity of nature" ("Black-topping the Green Mountains," 226). In 1982 the *Rutland Herald* also published a retrospective of the parkway debate under the headline "The Green Mountain Parkway: Vermont's First Environmental Battle" (7 March 1982, 1–2). A large body of evidence, however, indicates that the matter was not so simple, the divisions in the debate far less clear.
[76] Dennis E. Simmons, "Conservation, Cooperation, and Controversy: The Establishment of Shenandoah National Park, 1924–1936," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 89, 4 (1981): 134.
[77] Bryan and Bruno, "Black-topping the Green Mountains," 229.
[78] *Rutland Herald*, 2 March 1936, 8.
[79] Bryan, *Yankee Politics in Rural Vermont* (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1974), 232.
[80] *Burlington Free Press*, 6 March 1936, 2.

James Taylor's Progressive Vision: The Green Mountain Parkway

For Taylor, the parkway was synonymous with progress. It would open Vermont to the outside, literally as well as figuratively.

By HAL GOLDMAN

In a 1936 referendum Vermonters rejected a bond issue intended to provide funding for the Green Mountain Parkway. The parkway would have traveled the length of Vermont, following the spine of the Green Mountains, passing near the top of every major peak in the state, including Killington, Pico, Camel's Hump, Mansfield, and Jay. During the three years prior to the referendum, the parkway issue divided Vermonters along lines that violated the traditional social, economic, and political patterns that had come to define Vermont decisionmaking by the early twentieth century.

The proposal served as a lightning rod for many of the concerns Vermonters had about the future of their state. For many, the parkway proposal reflected all too sharply the atmosphere of uncertainty and change within Vermont. The arguments for and against it referenced a different relationship with the outside world in the future. The parkway promised greater federal involvement in the state, meaning more funds but also, perhaps, Vermonters' loss of control over their economic destiny. The

parkway was premised on the economic boon the state's scenery would provide and was thus a harbinger of a Vermont less reliant on agriculture and industry and more dependent on tourism. The parkway forced Vermonters to ask themselves who they were, what they valued, how they valued it, and where their state was headed. It asked them to do so while undergoing the stresses of the Great Depression.

If the parkway raised questions about what Vermont's future would look like, it also raised anew many of the chronic, deep-seated worries that had plagued Vermont during the previous century. Continuously forced to respond to the demands of a rapidly changing world, Vermonters no sooner adapted to these demands than they changed again. Solutions to Vermont's economic problems always had to take into account the limitations of its location and landscape. As people adapted their economic future to the geography, landscape came to be seen as an important component in their social development as well. To people living within and outside the state, Vermont's landscape, and especially its mountains, came to have a strong identifying value, molding the character of Vermonters themselves.

This aspect was not lost on Vermont's progressive reformers, who sought to improve the lives of rural Vermonters in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus, it is not surprising that landscape is featured so prominently in that showcase of their efforts, the Vermont Commission on Country Life. The commission's report, *Rural Vermont* (1931), includes a photograph and two-page description of a relief map of the state, encouraging every school in Vermont to purchase one.

The Committee on Topography and Climate explained the prominence of the relief map at the very beginning of its report:

> Of all the methods of presenting a region comprehensively to the eye none, the Committee feels, equals that of the relief model. For here can be depicted so that, without training in interpretation or much stretch of the imagination, "he who runs may read" the topography of a region in its true areal relationships, the trends of the mountains and valleys, the relative positions of uplands and lowlands, the courses of the streams, the positions of the lakes and minor features. The vertical distances are of necessity exaggerated but even this can be done in such moderation that no undue distortion is produced.[1]

Displaying a vertical scale of four to one, the relief map portrays Vermont as a collection of jagged, forbidding peaks with only a small proportion of flat land. It resembles Tibet far more than it does Vermont and is unrecognizable to anyone who has ever flown over the state's rolling countryside. The assumptions implicit in the committee's easy acceptance of such a skewed view of Vermont's topography is significant. How rugged

and mountainous did the commission members really believe Vermont was? Did the exaggerated relief map reflect the exaggerated importance Vermont's mountains played in the minds of its people? Opinions about what that landscape stood for and who should use and benefit from it varied greatly. The discourse of the main combatants in the parkway debate resonates with these conflicts.

"Content to Be a Valley People"

The parkway project was first proposed by William J. Wilgus in 1933. Wilgus, a renowned civil engineer, believed that the parkway ("Vermont's opportunity," as he called it) was the only project capable of qualifying for funds under the recently passed National Industrial Recovery Act. Wilgus asserted that Vermont would receive $10 million in direct funds for a project that would employ 6,000 to 8,000 people and bring with it a host of other tangible and intangible benefits for the state.[2]

Working very closely with Wilgus in promoting the plan was the Vermont Chamber of Commerce and its executive secretary, James Paddock Taylor.[3] Taylor had originated the idea of the Long Trail and founded the Green Mountain Club (GMC). As executive secretary of the chamber, he led an unceasing, often behind-the-scenes campaign on behalf of the parkway project during the three years it was under consideration in Vermont. In a two-year period, Taylor and Wilgus exchanged some sixty-three letters. It might seem odd that the man responsible for the Long Trail would work so hard on a project that many believed would destroy the trail and that GMC leaders vehemently opposed. But if we look at the reasoning behind Taylor's original efforts to create the Long Trail, we see that his focus was not on nature nor even on enjoyment of the mountains for their own sake. Instead, he was drawn to the mountains' usefulness in promoting his progressive program for Vermont's citizens.

Born in New York State on September 9, 1872, Taylor, the son of a Colgate math professor, attended Colgate Academy and Colgate University, graduating Phi Beta Kappa in 1895. After graduate work at Harvard and Columbia and travel to Germany, he returned to Colgate Academy to teach. In 1908 he moved to Vermont to assume the position of assistant principal at the Vermont Academy in Saxton's River.[4]

Taylor's interest in hiking trails grew out of his experiences at Vermont Academy. He strongly believed that outdoor activities were important to the physical and spiritual development of his charges. Taylor wrote a manuscript entitled "Outdoor Life and Sports for High Schools—A System for Vermont." One reason for the program, according to Taylor, was that a "proper state policy for Vermont is to do something new and differ-

James Paddock Taylor, about 1931–1933. Photograph by William Chandler, St. Albans.

ent and to do it first." Taylor further believed that "a Vermonter is not a genuine Vermonter, a citizen of the Green Mountain State until he really knows through personal observation and experience the Vermont land scape [*sic*], valley and mountains."[5]

Taylor also developed a program for the "non-athletic boy—a boy whose physique or whose temperament prevented him from entering or make him unwilling to enter the competitive social games." The advantages of outdoor sports (and by this he had in mind walking, mountain climbing, skiing, and snowshoeing) were, in order: (1) "almost no equipment"; (2) "always in open air, summer and winter"; (3) "all pitted, not against each other, but against time and space"; (4) "the sport is attractive in itself, and for its own merit and joys"; (5) "to learn these sports is needed part of culture, since we need them in later life"; (6) "the associated value connected with these activities"; (7) "not so much danger from overdoing"; (8) "no danger of professionalism"; and (9) "associated values with these activities: connected with nature study, enjoyment of scenery, study of humanity and history."[6] As this eclectic list indicates, Taylor attached numerous social values to his proposal. For example, people do not hike solely for hiking's sake; the main concern should be how hiking will further socially redeeming values. It is significant that Taylor placed "nature study" at the bottom of the list and then only as a subcategory of "associated values."

At the same time, Taylor was grappling in his own mind with the effect of Vermont's geography on the formation of its people's character. In an essay written in 1910 (the year of the GMC's founding), Taylor began with the presumption that "every true Vermonter is a mountaineer." He then cataloged each city and large village that had "its own local mountain deity." The state's nickname, the Green Mountain State,

> suggests not only geography, but also history. The mountains have bisected the life of the people, giving a special significance to the term. "East" and "West" as used by the politician and tradesman, and associating in the mind of the traveller and engineer the phrase "Over the mountain" with the difficult and the impossible. The mountains have also cultivated that passion for freedom and independence, that integrity and energy which characterize the "Green Mountain Boys" in war and in peace. The state seal has mountains in the background, for the genius of the state is the spirit of the mountains.[7]

In this analysis Taylor recites themes common to the congratulatory rhetoric of Vermonters from Ethan Allen onward.

But Taylor was beginning to wrestle with a more complex ideology of the mountains. In 1911 he spoke at a University of Vermont dinner in Boston on the topic of Vermont's mountains. In several pages that he omitted when he delivered the speech but retained in the manuscript,

Taylor wrote that the Green Mountains had always been perceived as a barrier. He imagined that a visitor to Vermont would note that the Green Mountain Boys had disappeared and that "the present citizens of this state wish the mountains could disappear too, and this with good reason." Taylor thought the visitor would be right, for

> the mountains have not proved to be blessings, through our effort to make them play a beneficent part in the life of the people, they have inevitably been a hindrance to the State of Vermont. Unclimbed, they have made a commonwealth of valley-dwellers, complacent and provincial. Undeveloped, they have fostered local conservatism and narrowness of interest. Unrevered, they have cultivated in us all an excess of individuality. And so the mountains have had their revenge on us. We have misinterpreted our mountains. Shadowed and hidden by our ranges, we have stayed close in the valley, content to be a valley people, each feeling that his mountain-fringed plot is a world.[8]

Of course many would argue that the very "conservatism" and "excess of individuality" Taylor decried in his speech were what made Vermonters special.

Taylor's solution to meeting the challenge of the mountains was contained in the GMC's constitution of 1910, in which the organization dedicated itself to making "the Vermont mountains play a larger part in the life of the people." The constitution further stipulated that "the object of the club shall be to make trails and roads."[9] This was the focus of the part of the speech Taylor *did* deliver: trails *and roads*—and with them, mountaintop development.

The speech Taylor made began, "There is but one public road to a Vermont mountain top, and that road does not approach Mount Mansfield from the direction of the State metropolis. The road to Killington along which years ago consumptives from the western and southern states were hurried to safety and health, looks now like the stony bed of a mountain torrent. Such mountains as Jay Peak and Camel's Hump, Equinox and Stratton, are inaccessible save to the pedestrian." Taylor detailed the lack of summit hotels, with the one exception on top of Mount Mansfield, and described the wreck of a hotel on Killington, "which contains but one room that is now habitable, and that only for very uncritical campers" who are exposed to a nightly "contentious symposium" of squealing porcupines. "And such, alas is our present mountain hospitality." Trails, too, were in short supply: "The Green Mountains have not been humanized. They have not been covered with a lace work of intricate trails." Taylor complained that there were no trails "from height to height, even where we have the opportunity to form such splendid mountain parks as could be made near Burlington and Rutland."[10]

Taylor kept scrapbooks of clippings pertaining to subjects that interested him, often annotating the articles with a thick red marker. In his scrapbook for August–December 1911, Taylor made the following entry:

> Spiel the New Vermont Its Features
> Unity of the State, No Longer overemphasis on Freedom
> Positive, No Longer A Negative Attitude Toward Life
> Energy, No Longer Lassitude
> Hospitality, No Longer Indifference to Public
> A Scientific, No Longer A Sentimental State
> Suggestions
> New Vermont, not so much a new state, as a new state of mind.[11]

We can see in these marginalia the grab-bag of progressive ideas that constituted Taylor's thinking. The emphasis on unity as opposed to freedom (and by this one assumes Taylor means individuality) is a classic progressive credo, as is the emphasis on optimism and science as opposed to negativity and sentiment. His reference to hospitality, though rooted in Vermont's attempts to cultivate the tourist trade, can also be seen as a desire to create an increasingly connected society in which Vermonters are more community oriented, less insular. In short, as he notes at the end of his list, what Taylor wanted was a new way of thinking about the world.

Taylor hoped to win this new view by reintroducing Vermonters to their mountains. If only Vermonters would climb to the tops of the Green Mountains, he argued, they would be able to see the wider world around them.[12] It followed that the development of Vermont's mountains would open Vermont to the outside world, and open Vermont minds to a different way of thinking.

Because Taylor was not much of a hiker or trail builder himself, his main contribution to the GMC and the Long Trail was their conception. Taylor left the work to others, most notably Clarence P. Cowles. He occasionally joined an afternoon outing of the GMC, but he directed his attention to other projects and began to spend considerably more time driving around the state in his Ford, which he called his "chariot of freedom."[13]

Taylor left Vermont Academy in 1912 for a job as secretary of the Greater Vermont Association. In 1922 the association became the Vermont State Chamber of Commerce. Taylor served as the chamber's executive secretary until his death in 1949.[14] In this capacity Taylor brought his commitment and energy to a crusade for paved roads and roadside beautification. In a speech before the Lions Club in October 1930, he spoke on "cities cemented together." "If Vermont is a vital contemporaneous part of the America of today," he said, "these architectural gems of Burlington and Montpelier either are, or are soon to be, chained together by road-

side parkways which will give aid and comfort to the eye and the spirit, just as does the ribbon of cement give aid and comfort to our physical selves."[15] Later that year, in a December radio speech in St. Albans entitled "240 Miles from Paradise," Taylor explained how economic development could be stimulated by road building: "to meet unemployment needs as well as development needs, Vermont should do what other states are doing, speed up her own public works. And our public works are highways."[16]

Road construction had to be accompanied by roadside beautification projects. In a 1931 speech Taylor noted that the "busiest men in the United States are proving to be Landscape Engineers, new and old, in the Highway Departments of the States."[17] Taylor cited "seven roadside sins": (1) "dead trees and lifeless branches," (2) "drunken tipsy fence posts," (3) "no man's land triangles at highway intersections," (4) "raw slopes," (5) "mechanical cadavers," (6) "bad sign placement," and (7) "gaunt vacant uninteresting barren stretches of roadside," where "entertaining pictures should be painted with trees and shrubs and flowers and ferns." According to Taylor, "wonderful pavement through wonderful country is to receive what it deserves, wonderful handling of the seven roadside sins, together with the restoration and perfecting of the most attractive roadside and nearby scenery in Vermont."[18]

Taylor expounded on similar motifs (for similar motives) in discussing paved roads. These roads would link together the people of the state and link Vermont to the rest of the country, ushering in a modern age and—he hoped—a new way of thinking. Here Taylor again stressed the use of roads to serve the interests of unity so important to him. But he also believed roads would impress outsiders. Taylor wanted Vermont to be more like the rest of the United States, more "contemporaneous." Vermont should do "what other states are doing."

"Where There Is No Vision, the People Perish"[19]

Given Taylor's attitudes and goals, it becomes easier to understand why he embraced Wilgus's parkway project with such enthusiasm. For Taylor, the parkway was synonymous with progress. It would open Vermont to the outside, literally as well as figuratively. A year before Wilgus proposed his plan, Taylor had written to William Beardsley, the president of the Vermont Chamber of Commerce. "If more and more Vermonters later from their own initiative and in their own way study the villages and cities and the highways and parkways of Westchester County, there will seep into Vermont consciousness more and more the ideas and tastes and desires that we need to inculcate in order to keep things going along the way in which they have been started."[20] After the parkway had been pro-

posed, Taylor explained that it would inspire others to pay more attention to secondary roads. In a letter to William Hazlett Upson, a contributor to the *Saturday Evening Post* and a parkway supporter, Taylor wrote that the project would have "a tremendous effect in toning up to Parkway standards a lot of our valley roads, so that they will become voluntary parkways."[21] The parkway had become a vehicle for the advancement of Taylor's other goals for Vermont in a concrete sense, by furthering road improvement and roadside beautification; more abstractly, it tied Vermonters into a modern, national mental outlook—"a new state of mind."[22]

Taylor saw federal involvement as a positive development for Vermont. It was important for him that the rest of the country look favorably on Vermont. On occasion Taylor seemed to fawn on the opinions of others. Recognition worked both ways. Acceptance by Washington implied (indeed, seemed to require) Vermont's acceptance of the federal project.[23] He was thus dismayed at the attitude of some Vermonters who felt that federal involvement in the state was to be avoided. "Why man, it was the intervention by the Federal Bureau of Public Roads through State Chamber initiative that helped set up our highway system back in '26 and '27. In my mind and experience that incident is the great fact about federal relations, and a fact to thank heaven for."[24] Taylor was cheered to learn that Wilgus had secured the favorable disposition of a "high Washington official": "I feel that the new day and the new deal for Vermont are right upon us."[25]

But as the project became bogged down in controversy, Taylor worried that Vermont was being left behind while other states jumped on the New Deal bandwagon. Parkways were being built in the South, New York and New Hampshire were planning parkways, and national parks were being created in the West. If other states were participating in the New Deal, why not Vermont?[26] Taylor glorified the National Recovery Administration: "There have been many interpretations of the letters NRA. Here is one invented in your honor and apropos to this occasion. It is applicable to every citizen in the United States Now Recreation Attainable."[27]

Taylor saw the parkway as another step in the perfection of the Vermont character. This progression depended first on trails and then on roads, as "dust and washboard roads were not the final word in Vermont's highways." After the Long Trail came better roads; now it was time for the parkway.[28] Noting that it had taken five years to get his "better roads crusade" going, Taylor wrote that "we will need some time to penetrate into every nook and corner of Vermont."[29]

It was not merely penetration into every "nook and corner" of Vermont that Taylor sought but the penetration of "modern" ideas into the minds of Vermonters. "The Parkway is a part of that program to get Vermont

out of her valley-mindedness into the big view of things which should be expected from a mountain people."[30] In an earlier letter to Boston landscape architect John Nolen, Taylor wrote, "My opinion of the proposed survey for the Green Mountain Parkway is that not merely in itself and for itself, but also in all its connotations and implications along planning and state designing lines this survey will be one of the most significant and influential things which ever happened in Vermont."[31] Speaking more generally of the project, Taylor wrote Wilgus, "I am more and more convinced that the Parkway project and all that goes with it in related ideas and setups is a supremely important thing for Vermont."[32]

Taylor's projects, from the Long Trail to paved roads and finally the parkway, were held together by the idea of using Vermont's landscape as an instrument of progress. In a letter to Wilgus, Taylor explained that years before he had looked at the Green Mountain range and wondered whether a footpath would extend over the summit of the mountains from one side of the state to the other. "That was twenty-four years ago. Now the Parkway idea fits right into the mental niche which was once the locus of the pathway dream and hope."[33]

"The Stage Has Been Set and Our Minds Prepared"

Taylor's belief that the parkway was a godsend for Vermont led him to conclude that opposition could only be the result of ignorance about the project's real attributes and merits. Given his background as a pedagogue, it is not surprising that he stressed the need to educate people. Once Vermonters became educated about the true merits of the project, Taylor was confident that they would be nearly unanimous in accepting it. "The difficulty is that people do not understand this language and are not aware of such a lot of things. How are we to make them aware?"[34] Adding to the problem of educating Vermonters was what Taylor saw as their instinctive conservatism. "It takes time to sift the truth from the false through the sieve of popular reactions. Then, Vermont sieves slowly anyway."[35] And the proponents did not think that they had much time. On June 15, 1934, the Chamber of Commerce decided to create a Parkway Committee, which would focus its energies on obtaining approval of the project.[36] Corresponding with Upson, who was later named chairman of the Parkway Committee's publicity subcommittee, Taylor regretted the speed with which the idea had to be communicated to the people: "It is too bad this whole game had to be played out so rapidly, because ordinarily a long educational period must precede the acceptance of any new idea in Vermont."[37] As a result, he spent much of his time devising with Wilgus and others ways to educate Vermonters and others about the project—an approach made all the more necessary given what the two men

saw as a relentless campaign of disinformation being waged by the anti-New Deal *Rutland Herald* as well as Taylor's own Green Mountain Club.

In language that reflected a typically progressive mixture of impatience and presumptuousness, Taylor often told Wilgus and others of the grave difficulties they faced in trying to educate Vermonters about the parkway—or about anything for that matter. The problem was that Vermonters saw themselves as a special people, a view that did not jibe with Taylor's desire to make Vermont like the rest of the country. "We must realize that we are dealing with a people who feel that in some ways they are 'different' and wish to remain 'different.'"[38] Commenting on how "parks and parkways and publicity must ride into every county in the state," an exasperated Taylor told Wilgus, "Ye Gods, what effort and effort it takes to snaggle a mob of people into an idea or a procedure."[39]

Writing to John Thomas, vice president of the National Life Insurance Company and president of the Parkway Committee, Taylor commented on "the fundamentalists [*sic*] letter from Isle La Motte which is passionate to have Vermont remain 'unspoiled' assuming that a Parkway means tin cans and garbage along the right of way. Oh Lord, how long, how long?"[40]

Seeking information about national parks, Taylor explained to the director of the National Park Service that "we are anxious to secure data on the development of the National Park System, which will help orient Vermonters in the National Park world." Vermonters "need to know what has been happening, what it means and why an opportunity to enter into and share the move would be a blessing for Vermont. They need to get the national viewpoint about all this business and see things in the large."[41]

In Taylor's mind it was not just ordinary people who needed educating. Taylor was prepared to challenge what he saw as misperceptions by a host of experts as well. When the Vermont House of Representatives first defeated a bill to fund the state portion of the parkway, Taylor characterized the vote as "careless."[42] Writing to Nolen on difficulties with Vermonters, he stated, "Some of them are far from realizing it, and object to having anything other than the Long Trail pathway through the Green Mountains. We are engaged in the interesting task of trying to persuade some that Vermont really needs something and that this is it. Some job!"[43]

In selling the project, Wilgus served as front man, tirelessly pursuing a course of speaking engagements before civic and social organizations. In addition Wilgus used his contacts in Washington to gain the ear of members of the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, primarily through the president's nephew, Frederic A. Delano, chairman of the Advisory Committee of National Planning, and Colonel E. M. Waite, the deputy ad-

ministrator of Public Works. Wilgus wrote Taylor that he had asked Delano for an appointment with Roosevelt, "whom I should hope to win to the project."[44]

Taylor, for his part, used his knowledge of the Vermont political scene to advise Wilgus and others on the campaign.[45] He also applied his brand of chamber-of-commerce boosterism to the project, which consisted mainly of getting as many influential people on board as possible, reflecting the extraordinary importance he placed on their opinions, particularly if they were from outside Vermont.

He quickly contacted Nolen and another Boston-based landscape architect, Frederick Law Olmsted Jr. Nolen, who had given a speech at the annual meeting of the Vermont Chamber of Commerce in Burlington in 1930, was a wholehearted supporter of the project.[46] Olmsted was not. In response to a letter from Taylor, Olmsted admitted that he was not sufficiently familiar with the territory involved "to form a confident and thoroughly well grounded opinion" but believed the project to be "of very doubtful expediency and possibly very wasteful and unwise." Olmsted referred to a negative editorial in the *Boston Herald* on the parkway project. He acknowledged the bias of the editor against road extension into wilderness areas but thought the editor's points against the project (especially on economic grounds) were probably valid. As Olmsted saw it, the project paralleled the Mulholland Drive project in Los Angeles, which he had studied as part of recommendations he had prepared for a system of parks and parkways for Los Angeles County. The drive followed the crest of the Santa Monica Mountains, first on one side then on the other, with scenic views through undeveloped country. Lateral roads connected population centers through the passes. Though the drive offered scenic views, it was little used, even by tourists, who preferred more direct routes between population centers. The road had been expensive to build and expensive to maintain. Taxpayers were unwilling to pay for the maintenance of a road that was "of no direct commercial value and . . . inconveniently remote from their places of residence and business." Olmsted concluded that "there is little doubt now that the Mulholland road was a wasteful piece of extravagance."[47]

Given Olmsted's stature and the disturbing similarities between the Mulholland project and the parkway plan, Taylor found his comments threatening and dismissed Olmsted's opinion. Referring to Nolen's support and Olmsted's opposition, Taylor wrote Wilgus that doctors "will disagree and sometimes the layman's judgment ought to count some as between conflicting doctors."[48] Notwithstanding a clumsy attempt by Wilgus to tempt him with the job of landscape architect for the project, Olmsted never spoke out in favor of the parkway. When the time came

to appoint a consulting landscape architect for the initial survey, Nolen got the position.[49]

Taylor spent a great deal of time and effort trying to prove that the parkway was not a new idea. To detractors as well as supporters, he often sent a copy of the GMC's constitution, pointing out that the club's object was to build trails *and roads.*[50] Writing to Thomas, Taylor explained that the GMC's constitution was "'vague' but the road element in that constitution is invaluable now."[51]

He placed supreme importance on Thomas's 1916 report as president of Middlebury College. In the report Thomas noted Joseph Battell's 1915 gift to the college of 25,000 acres of mountain land and an additional devise to the United States for a national park. Thomas proposed that the lands be joined, additional land purchased for the park, and a road built along a strip from approximately the Lincoln Gap south to the Brandon Gap, a distance of some 25 miles: "I have in mind the crest of the ridge, extending down the mountains on either side sufficiently to allow the construction of a scenic highway along its entire length."[52] Taylor noted that the Committee on Summer Residents and Tourists had also proposed a scenic highway. In its report to the Vermont Commission on Country Life in 1931, the committee had advocated construction of a road "well up on the slopes of the Green Mountains, on either side of this range, constructed in semi-permanent form."[53] Taylor took every opportunity to explain to the public the evolution of the mountain road idea in his own speeches and press releases.[54]

Earlier precedents (none of which was ever built, with the exception of the Smuggler's Notch road) would seem to have no bearing on the Green Mountain Parkway project. But Taylor wanted to emphasize that others had discussed mountain roads before the Wilgus proposal came along; because he believed that Vermonters had to have time to digest an idea. Earlier talk of mountain roads had, he believed, given them that time. Taylor told Thomas that the Middlebury report would be useful: "the object is to make your early proposition loom in the mind of the public as a precedent for the plan which is now engaging so much popular attention."[55] Writing to Wilgus about Theodore Vail's 1912 comment about the need for "millions of dollars [to be] spent on mountain roads,"[56] Taylor explained that "it shows that the idea of mountain roads has been at least voiced a number of times so that the conservative Vermonter really need not feel that he is being rushed into something that had never even vaguely referred to years and years ago. Psychology is harder than rocks and heavier than lead. Would that we could find some philosopher's stone to work transmutation."[57] According to Taylor, the mountain road precedent meant that "the stage has been set and our minds prepared" for the Wilgus park-

way.[58] Taylor thought he understood the psychology of Vermonters and tailored his message accordingly.

Both Taylor and Wilgus also understood the importance of newspapers in the debate, not only inside but also outside the state. Wilgus worked the newspapers from the front, appearing at functions the press would cover and addressing the Vermont Press Association.[59] Taylor worked behind the scenes, monitoring the local papers and repeatedly sending summaries of the editorial stances of local papers to Wilgus and Governor Stanley C. Wilson.[60] He issued chamber press releases such as Wilgus's parkway prospectus, "Vermont's Opportunity," which was fed to papers throughout the state and nation.[61] The chamber also printed copies of an address by William Hazlett Upson, reprinted a summary of the 1934 federal survey of the route, and distributed an informational broadside.[62] Wilgus early on acknowledged Taylor's excellent contacts with the papers.[63] In September 1934 Taylor had copies of a report on the initial survey of the parkway by the parkway's resident engineer, Laurie D. Cox, mailed to 125 newspapers in New England, New York, and New Jersey. "The beauty of this article," Taylor wrote, "is that it gives the whole subject a new orientation and new values."[64] The chamber made 3,000 copies of the report, and Taylor sent copies to anyone who wrote him about the project.[65]

The proponents' most influential organ within Vermont was the *Burlington Free Press.* Its publisher, David Willard Howe, cooperated with the chamber in promoting the project, as did its editor, Edward E. Crane. Commenting on their importance to the cause, Taylor told Wilgus: "All the intellectual fodder which you can give Editor Crane and Proprietor Howe of the *Free Press* is a blessed gift because you are helping build up in the newspaper mind and through that in the public mind a new and proper conception of the design and destiny of Vermont."[66] Taylor, clearly alluding to the *Rutland Herald*'s objection that the parkway was a frivolous use of funds in the face of Vermont's more pressing problems, praised one of Crane's editorials as necessary "to counteract the eternal vapidity of this talk of money, money, money for flood control."[67] Wilgus called Crane "a tower of strength."[68] They also had an ally in Frank E. Howe, the publisher of the *Bennington Banner.* Howe was the first to propose and promote a state system of hard-surfaced roads.[69]

Although both men attempted to manipulate the press and were perfectly happy when the editorial bias went their way at the *Free Press,* they were utterly intolerant of the *Rutland Herald*'s attempts to defeat the proposal by utilizing those same tactics. Though many opposed the project and though the Green Mountain Club also mounted organized resistance, Taylor directed most of his ire at the *Herald,* which was owned

by GMC members William H. Field and his son William Jr. The *Herald* became the scapegoat for all the parkway's difficulties because Taylor considered it to be the most significant threat to the project—as did many other proponents.[70]

Commenting on Wilgus's numerous engagements, Taylor wrote, "Your speaking dates thrill me, especially the one with the Rutland Rotary. Here's an opportunity for you with hurricanic eloquence to blow away the RUTLAND HERALD smoke screen which lies heavy on some of their minds So do blow hard."[71] Following a petition drive by the *Herald*, Taylor noted that the paper was becoming "well nigh pathological."[72] Advocates of the plan were so threatened by the *Herald*'s campaign that Thomas Wright sent a letter to President Roosevelt. Probably written by Taylor, the letter stated that "genuine fair factual criticism of any proposal is most welcome, but the misconceptions and the misinterpretations reflected in the enclosed appeal and petition mislead the public and thus fail to be significant." The letter closed with the remark that the "newspapers as a whole and the Vermont peple [*sic*] as a whole are for the Mountain Parkway. Official Vermont is for it. Exceptions prove the rule. We feel that it is only fair to you through this letter and the enclosures to let you know how we fail to understand just really why the RUTLAND HERALD opposes and has opposed the Parkway plan." The initial draft of the letter indicated that copies of the *Herald*'s petition were to be included; this language was omitted from the final copy, which instead made reference to "enclosures." It is unclear whether the chamber did send copies of the petition directly to Roosevelt. If it did, it certainly would have been a blunder.[73] Even if the administration had never before heard of the *Rutland Herald*, between this letter and Wright's later letter to Ickes explaining that the *Herald* was now on board, the proponents had certainly signaled the paper's importance.

Taylor was worried that the *Herald*'s activities were having an effect on public opinion. He told Thomas that he had been informed that the rural mail carriers, influenced by the newspaper's ideas, wondered whether money should be spent on improving the roads they used rather than on anything less practical and of less benefit to them.[74] At a chamber meeting, Taylor queried how to handle the *New York Tribune*'s opposition to the parkway.[75] Taylor sent material to the *Tribune* in an effort to "get some positive material to them who have been following the cue of the RUTLAND HERALD a little too much."[76]

On August 11, 1934, Wilgus informed Taylor that he was leaving Vermont to assume the job of director of work relief for New York City. He would be supervising 140,000 men and women and a $120 million budget.[77] Taylor pointed out that Wilgus's labor and budget responsibil-

ities amounted to one parkway per month.[78] The two men continued to correspond on the project for another year, and Wilgus did what he could from afar.

Taylor idolized Wilgus. Perhaps Taylor saw in this nationally famous man with White House contacts someone he could never be. While Wilgus displayed affection for Taylor, Taylor's letters were filled with adulation for Wilgus. Early in the campaign Taylor wrote Wilgus, "I stand in awe of your vision and your undying persistence which will be rewarded with the crown of glory which they deserve."[79] Four days later he went on with his praise: "What a fight you have fought! How glad everybody is to make any possible contribution to forwarding what you have championed so valiantly. Vermont owes you undying gratitude, which will be recorded even in the RUTLAND HERALD some fair day."[80]

As time wore on and quick approval of the project by Washington became less and less likely, Taylor became increasingly bitter. He lashed out at Vermont's conservatism and railed against the *Herald.* Furious with the "conservative standpatter" and the "bitter-ender," Taylor fretted about the effect of William Hazlett Upson's reference to "all Vermonters" in a *Herald* article on the parkway. "A statement of that kind makes it possible for a tiny minority either through selfish or special interest or stupidity or a desire to oppose everything, to hold up God's truth."[81] A negative editorial (in the *Burlington Free Press* no less) reflected "the obfuscation of the public mind during the last few days and weeks. . . . You see, our Republican virtue is not to be incriminated by the reception of any gifts from the Federal Government. That would be accepting a bribe. It would be endangering the immaculacy of our alabaster Republicanism. God forbid that there should be the slightest taint on our summum bonum."[82]

In 1935 the parkway debate left the forum of amorphous public opinion and entered the realm of statehouse politics. The stresses of this process often revealed a more candid admission of the problems some of the combatants faced in attempting to prevail on the issue. Most immediately, Taylor had to rectify a terrible tactical blunder Wilgus had made in promoting his project: playing up its scope. In "Vermont's Opportunity" Wilgus had stated that the parkway would initially require a 1,000-foot corridor, to which would be added lands 5 to 15 miles wide totaling 1 million acres, or one-sixth of the state. The *Herald* began pointing out this aspect of the project almost immediately.[83] The notion of one-sixth of Vermont's territory being taken over by the federal government was bad enough, but coupled with the controversy over another New Deal–inspired project, it generated serious animosity toward the parkway. During 1934 a conflict had arisen between Governor Wilson and Speaker of the Vermont House of Representatives George Aiken over plans to

retire so-called submarginal lands. Wilson had moved forward on the issue by appointing a committee to make recommendations about which land should be retired, so that Vermont could collect its share of federal Agricultural Adjustment Administration funds. In so doing, Wilson argued that the retirement program would "hasten and render less painful" a process that had been going on in any case since the middle of the nineteenth century: the abandonment of unproductive hill farms. In August 1934, as the selectmen and residents of various hilltowns began to offer their land for sale to the government, Aiken warned against selling too much land to the federal government since the land would someday be needed for homes. Aiken argued that the federal government should be helping to rehabilitate hilltowns rather than demolishing them.

The debate about the land retirement program raged in the General Assembly at the same time it was considering the parkway. The Vermont Grange, the chamber, and the *Free Press, Burlington News*, and *Brattleboro Reformer* favored the land retirement program, just as they favored the parkway. The General Assembly appointed a committee to look into the issue but created a foregone conclusion when it appointed Aiken (by then the lieutenant governor) as committee chairman. Having initially asked that 30,000 acres of submarginal land be retired, the proponents of the program by early 1936 were calling for almost 500,000 acres to be retired and 13,000 people to be resettled. Aiken saw to it, however, that the federal government did not end up buying any submarginal land in Vermont.[84] Historian Richard Judd has pointed out that one cannot determine how a majority of Vermonters felt about the land retirement controversy. Sam Hand, however, has suggested that the parkway vote was in fact a partial referendum on this issue.[85]

Taylor understood, perhaps too late, that Wilgus's ambition for a huge park had unnecessarily embroiled the parkway in a much larger and more politically partisan battle over submarginal lands, thus giving parkway opponents like the *Herald* yet another argument against it. In April 1934 the paper wrote that the parkway would force people off their land. Taylor responded, "So Hindley registers against some of the fundamentals of planning, and we can feel at home with the *Herald* as exuding negation."[86] But Taylor knew that the issue was hurting the plan's chances.

Two weeks before the initial House vote, Taylor explained the problem to John Thomas. He wrote that Wilgus's proposed million-acre park had "scared people to death." Such a park, Taylor wrote, would "sop up and wipe out town after town. Of course the Colonel did not think it out from that angle, but the Legislature naturally has." Taylor told Thomas that in the early days of the proposal Howard Hindley had pointed out

that Wilgus's park would have taken one-quarter of the state and that this information "gave [Hindley] a fright and he used it to frighten others."

Taylor went on to explain that Speaker of the House Ernest Moore, a vigorous opponent of the parkway, had a copy of Wilgus's original map on his wall. The map showed the million-acre park in order "to frighten him and others." Taylor asked Thomas to point out to people that the bills before the House called for only 50,000 acres for a parkway corridor, "a very limited and restricted affair." He went on to explain that Wilgus had presented his parkway as a "nucleus" for a vast expanse. "It's the vast expansion that the Legislature is afraid of. If they feel that the acceptance of the Parkway will commit them to the evolution of a vast scheme in the way of a Park, they will pretty likely refuse to do anything." Taylor encouraged Thomas to make clear to people that the parkway really was not such a monumental undertaking as it seemed. As for Wilgus, Taylor wrote that "naturally he could not get away from his engineer conception of a big ultimate idea. That is what has made a lot of trouble."[87] Of course, Taylor was a man of big ideas as well. He had helped Wilgus put "Vermont's Opportunity" together. The mistake had been just as much his.

Responding more generally to parkway opponents, Taylor painted a clear picture of the progressive/New Deal future he envisioned for Vermont—a vision he believed his opponents foolishly rejected. Writing about the GMC's alternative plan for the development of valley roads, he pointed out how the opposition had played "to a number of inherent Vermont characteristics in their title and their arguments. They talk about 'Vermont for Vermonters' and appeal to the instincts for independence, avoidance of outside control, eschewing large expenditures, slow progress along old lines."[88]

Ever interested in the Vermont psyche, Taylor thought that if the symptom was a lack of interest in the parkway, the problem was all in Vermonters' heads. He wrote Wilgus that "the battle of the wilderness is still on" and noted the "mysterious psychology of Vermont." "It drives almost to desperation those who are striving to cope with it in the interest of forward looking activity."[89] As the showdown over the parkway was taking place in the General Assembly, Taylor regretted that such struggle was still necessary. He complained to Wilgus that "after your superb work in selling the idea to Washington and to Vermont, it seems too bad that so much struggle still hangs on. But there are certain independencies and individualisms in our systems which must be worked off before anything can be accepted."[90] Writing to Nolen, Taylor said that he "treasured" his comments and those of Washington "on our mentality and problems. The fascination of the present situation is how to deal with a pathological case."[91] As Taylor saw it, the patient was very sick.

Conclusion

An initial vote permitting acquisition of land for the parkway was defeated in the Vermont House and approved in the Senate in March 1935. Later that year both houses authorized the state to incur bonded debt for the acquisition of parkway rights-of-way up to $500,000. The bill required endorsement by the voters at town meeting the following March.

The referendum question was defeated by 12,000 votes. Taylor and others continued their efforts to get the General Assembly to approve the parkway, but to no avail. The project was dead.

Taylor continued as executive secretary at the Vermont Chamber of Commerce. His last battle was an attempt to get Burlington to install a sewage treatment plant to help end the contamination that had turned the waterfront into a "cesspool"—an effort that was ultimately successful. In typical Taylor fashion he spread the antipollution gospel through numerous presentations to various service organizations meeting at the Hotel Vermont. At each meeting Taylor would bolster his view of the need for a treatment plant by displaying his signature "horse race" chart, which showed the progress of various states in their antipollution efforts and legislation compared to Vermont.[92]

By 1949 Taylor had been secretary of the Greater Vermont Association and the chamber for thirty-seven years. Old and crippled by a broken hip, he shuffled around the streets of Burlington looking disheveled, a cigar always in his mouth. A lifelong bachelor, he had lived alone in a room at the Van Ness Hotel for nineteen years.[93] On a late summer day, he took a taxi out to the Sand Bar Inn in South Hero. He was seen pacing up and down the road, appearing to witnesses "pre-occupied, dejected and ill at ease." He had his dinner, smoked some cigars, and then rented a rowboat. He paddled out onto the lake and was never seen alive again—almost certainly a suicide. Authorities found his body floating offshore six days later.[94]

Taylor's boosterism was the focus of his life; the projects he promoted and the values he espoused were inseparable for him. Obstacles to those projects became obstacles to the fulfillment of his progressive vision. This explains his extraordinary commitment to the parkway, as well as his intolerance for anyone who was against it. In Taylor's mind, those who opposed the parkway opposed Vermont itself.

Notes

[1] Vermont Commission on Country Life, *Rural Vermont: A Program for the Future by Two Hundred Vermonters* (Burlington: Vermont Commission on Country Life, 1931), 35.

[2] William J. Wilgus, typescript autobiography, 1948, 241–242, Wilbur Collection, Special Collections, Bailey/Howe Library, University of Vermont; Wilgus, "Vermont's Opportunity" (Burling-

ton: Vermont State Chamber of Commerce, 1933), 2. A copy is located in the Green Mountain Parkway Reference File, Wilbur Collection.

[3] On July 17, 1933, the Vermont Chamber of Commerce adopted resolutions favoring the idea of a Vermont scenic mountain parkway. Taylor Papers, box T-7, "Green Mountain Parkway 1916–Aug. 1933," Vermont Historical Society, Montpelier.

[4] "Jas. P. Taylor, Vt. C. of C. Secy., Is Missing," *Burlington Free Press*, 7 September 1949, sec. 2, 1; Reidun Nuquist, "Founding of the Green Mountain Club," *Vermont History News* 36 (1985): 60–63; Laura Waterman and Guy Waterman, *Forest and Crag* (Boston: Appalachian Mountain Club, 1989), 353–357.

[5] James P. Taylor, undated typescript, Taylor Papers, box T-7, "Green Mountain Club 1911–1914."

[6] Ibid.

[7] Taylor, typescript, 1910, Taylor Papers, box T-7, "Green Mountain Club 1911–1914." Taylor's reference to the state seal is a description of what is now the state "coat of arms." That design, which shows Mount Mansfield and Camel's Hump, was the state seal from 1821 to 1937.

[8] Taylor, speech delivered in Boston, 1911, 4–6, Taylor Papers, box T-7, "Green Mountain Club 1911–1914."

[9] For a complete copy of the GMC's original 1910 constitution, see Louis J. Paris, "The Green Mountain Club: Its Purposes and Projects," *Vermonter* 16 (1911): 151–171.

[10] Taylor, Boston speech, 1–3.

[11] Taylor, "Scrap Book 1911 August–December," Taylor Papers, box T-1. Taylor's reference to freedom and unity reflected the tension inherent in Vermont's motto.

[12] Referring to the parkway in 1934, Taylor wrote, "The third and the best third of all our landscape beauties is the far-flung vision of the valleys from the moutain [*sic*] slopes, valleys viewed in the large, miles and miles of mountain-set valleys with their adventuring streams and their clusters of lakes." "Only One Third Revealed Only One Third of a Revelation," 1934, Taylor Papers, box T-7, "Green Mountain Parkway 1934 Jan.–June."

[13] Waterman and Waterman, *Forest and Crag*, 357–358; John T. Cowles, conversation with the author, Burlington, Vermont, December 12, 1994. Cowles is the son of Clarence P. Cowles. Taylor was a frequent unannounced dinner guest at the Cowles household in Burlington and was an adopted uncle of the Cowles children, including John. "C. P.," as Taylor called him, was one of Taylor's best friends and supported the parkway project; see Clarence P. Cowles to Governor Wilson, 26 August 1933, Taylor Papers, box T-7, on Cowles's support of the parkway in which he points out that the object of the GMC was to "make trails and roads."

[14] Nuquist, "Founding of the Green Mountain Club," 61–63.

[15] Taylor, speech to Lions Club, 27 October 1930, Taylor Papers, box T-2, notebook 4.

[16] Taylor, radio address given at St. Albans, 3 December 1930, ibid.

[17] Taylor, speech, 1931, ibid.

[18] Taylor, TS of speech (ca. 1931), ibid.

[19] Taylor to Wilgus, 10 August 1933, Taylor Papers (unless otherwise indicated, all correspondence cited hereafter is from boxes T-7 and T-8 of the Taylor Papers).

[20] Taylor to William H. Beardsley, 21 June 1932.

[21] Taylor to William Hazlett Upson, 8 September 1933.

[22] Taylor, "Scrap Book 1911 August–December," Taylor Papers, box T-1.

[23] Roosevelt reportedly favored a parkway in New Hampshire and Maine because he believed Vermonters did not want it, sending parkway proponents into a frenzy of activity to demonstrate that this was not the case. Wilgus to John Thomas, 24 September 1934. Wilgus was critical of Governor Wilson for what Wilgus saw as Wilson's refusal to articulate to Roosevelt that Vermonters indeed favored the parkway—a failure he saw as deadly to its chances of winning funding: "If not done quickly, we lose"; Wilgus to Taylor, 24 September 1934. "The Governor is the only one who can authoritatively interpret Vermont sentiment on this score, and he is the one to set the President straight"; Wilgus to Taylor, 30 September 1934. Following an endorsement of the project by the Vermont Grange, Wilgus wrote, "Perhaps the Governor will now feel justified in coming out with a strong pronouncement in its favor"; Wilgus to Taylor, 25 October 1934.

[24] Taylor to John Nolen, 2 April 1935.

[25] Taylor to Wilgus, 22 September 1933.

[26] Taylor to Wilgus, 13 March 1934.

[27] Taylor, typescript, 1934, Taylor Papers, box T-7, "Green Mountain Parkway 1934 Jan.–June."

[28] Taylor, typescript (ca. 1934), ibid.

[29] Taylor to John Orcutt, 15 February 1934. Orcutt, a Wall Street lawyer, was a Vermont native.

[30] Taylor to Nolen, 2 April 1935.

[31] Taylor to Nolen, 12 March 1934.

[32] Taylor to Wilgus, 9 March 1934.

[33] Taylor to Wilgus, 28 June 1934.

[34] Taylor to Wilgus, 9 March 1934.

[35] Taylor to Wilgus, 1 April 1935.

[36] Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Vermont Chamber of Commerce, 15 June 1934, Taylor Papers, box T-7, "Green Mountain Parkway 1934 Jan.-June." The committee consisted of John M. Thomas, Montpelier; H. C. Comings, Richford; S. M. Driscoll, St. Albans; David W. Howe, Burlington; Luther B. Johnson, Randolph; Fred C. Martin, Bennington; Howard C. Rice, Brattleboro; Miles S. Sawyer, Rutland; William J. Wilgus, Ascutney; John E. Weeks, Middlebury; T. B. Wright, Burlington. A publicity subcommittee was later formed and Upson appointed chairman.

[37] Taylor to Upson, 15 September 1933.

[38] Taylor to Wilgus, 21 August 1933.

[39] Taylor to Wilgus, 28 May 1934.

[40] Taylor to Thomas, 17 July 1934.

[41] Taylor to Arno B. Cammerer, 16 December 1935.

[42] Taylor to Charles E. Crane, 3 April 1935. Crane was the director of publicity for National Life Insurance Company in Montpelier.

[43] Taylor to John Nolen, 2 August 1933.

[44] Wilgus to Taylor, undated (probably September 1933).

[45] Taylor to Wilgus, 7 December 1933. Wilgus asked Taylor and Thomas B. Wright, the president of the chamber, to review the script of his forthcoming radio speech.

[46] John Nolen, "Order and Beauty in State and City" (Rutland: Vermont State Chamber of Commerce, 1930). Nolen pointed out Vermont's similarities to Switzerland but said that it was not reaping the benefits it should from tourism. He argued that it lacked "wide highways developed in parkway fashion." Copy in Taylor Papers, box T-7, "Green Mountain Parkway 1916-Aug. 1933."

[47] Olmsted to Taylor, 18 September 1933.

[48] Taylor to Wilgus, 27 September 1933.

[49] Wilgus to Olmsted, 28 September 1933. After explaining to Olmsted why the parkway deserved approval, Wilgus added a handwritten postscript: "Of course," he wrote, "if this project goes through, it will be one to be planned and executed under the direction of a landscape architect." When Wilgus learned of Nolen's application for the job, he wrote Taylor that he thought it would go to Olmsted. Telegram from Nolen to Taylor, 3 March 1934; Wilgus to Taylor, 7 March 1934.

[50] Taylor to Marian Hardy, 24 August 1933. Hardy had written Taylor to voice her opposition to the project. "It doesn't seem possible that Vermonters will permit their Long Trail to be destroyed by a motor road along the Green Mountains. Even if it doesn't 'follow' the Trail, it will ruin the sense of remoteness." Hardy to Taylor, 22 August 1933.

[51] Taylor to Thomas, 26 August 1933.

[52] John Thomas, *Annual Report of the President of Middlebury College* (Middlebury, Vt.: Middlebury College, 1916), 28-29. Copy in Wilbur Collection, Special Collections, Bailey/Howe Library, University of Vermont.

[53] Vermont Commission on Country Life, *Rural Vermont*, 130-131.

[54] "J. P. Taylor Praises Plan for Parkway," *Rutland Daily Herald*, 14 July 1934, 4.

[55] Taylor to Thomas, 29 August 1933.

[56] Theodore Vail, the president of Bell Telephone, was a citizen of Lyndonville and, according to Taylor, a strong supporter of the idea of the Long Trail. "Inevitably, on account of his great weight and his age, Mr. Vail's personal interest in the Long Trail had to be purely vicarious. But no man ever loved Vermont scenery more than he." Taylor, radio speech delivered on 12 July 1934, box T-7, "Green Mountain Parkway 1934 July-Dec."

[57] Taylor to Wilgus, 10 September 1934.

[58] Taylor, radio speech delivered on 12 July 1934.

[59] "Gilpin, Wilgus, and Rice Debate Parks," *Rutland Daily Herald*, 11 August 1933, 1.

[60] Taylor to Wilgus, 21 August 1933; Taylor to Governor Wilson, 21 August 1933.

[61] Taylor had used the same technique in promoting the Green Mountain Club in 1911. Working with Charles R. Cummings, the editor of the *Vermonter* (the forerunner of *Vermont Life*), he created a special issue on the club that featured seventeen photographs. In a campaign subsidized by the newly created Vermont Bureau of Publicity, the GMC purchased 5,000 copies above their normal circulation, mailing 3,000 to out-of-staters. Nuquist, "Founding of the Green Mountain Club," 54.

[62] William Hazlett Upson, "The Green Mountain Parkway" (Burlington: Vermont State Chamber of Commerce, 1934); "Green Mountain Parkway: Reconnaissance Survey" (Burlington: Vermont State Chamber of Commerce, 1934); "Parkway Questions Answered" (Burlington: Vermont State Chamber of Commerce, 1934). Copies are located in the Green Mountain Parkway Reference File, Wilbur Collection, Special Collections, Bailey/Howe Library, University of Vermont.

[63] Wilgus to Taylor, 25 August 1933.

[64] Taylor to Nolen, 25 September 1934. Laurie D. Cox, "The Greatest Single Artistic Opportunity Presented to the People of New England" (Burlington: Vermont State Chamber of Commerce, 1934). Copy in the Green Mountain Parkway Reference File, Wilbur Collection.

[65] Taylor, meeting of the Headquarters Committee of the Chamber of Commerce, 19 September 1934, Taylor Papers, box T-7, "Green Mountain Parkway 1934 July–Dec."

[66] Taylor to Wilgus, 21 November 1933.

[67] Taylor to Wilgus, 19 April 1934.

[68] Wilgus to Taylor, 20 April 1934.

[69] Arthur F. Stone, ed., *The Vermont of Today: With Its Historic Background, Attractions and People*, vol. 3 (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing, 1929), 87–88.

[70] In April 1934 both Taylor and Wilgus thought the *Herald* had reversed itself and supported the project; they were to be disappointed. Parkway proponents believed this was so significant that President Wright of the chamber wrote Ickes to inform him of the *Herald*'s reversal. "The HERALD which fathered the 'Petition' of last Fall now takes a new and welcoming view of the proposed Green Mountain Parkway. The enclosed editorial from this morning's BURLINGTON FREE PRESS shows how glad the rest of the state is that the HERALD is now disposed to join in and make sentiment absolutely unanimous"; Wright to Ickes, 24 April 1934. Wilgus wrote Taylor that "the support of the Herald will go far to put over the larger scheme"; Wilgus to Taylor, 2 June 1934.

[71] Taylor to Wilgus, 27 September 1933.

[72] Taylor to Wilgus, 8 November 1933.

[73] Wright to Roosevelt, 7 November 1933; copy in the Taylor Papers.

[74] Taylor to Thomas, 17 July 1934.

[75] Taylor, memorandum to the chamber, 19 September 1934, box T-7, "Green Mountain Parkway 1934 July–Dec."

[76] Taylor to Nolen, 28 September 1934.

[77] Wilgus to Taylor, 11 August 1934.

[78] Taylor to Wilgus, 13 August 1934.

[79] Taylor to Wilgus, 22 September 1933.

[80] Taylor to Wilgus, 26 September 1933. This language was by no means unusual for Taylor. "Oh for a thousand men like you! or for a hundred men! or for just ten men!"; Taylor to Wilgus, 8 November 1933. When Taylor learned that Wilgus would be delivering a radio speech on the project, he gushed, "How I wish I could listen to your radio voice"; Taylor to Wilgus, 4 December 1933. Despite their work together, however, and despite their sixty-three letters back and forth to one another, they never addressed each other by first name. It was always "Dear Mr. Taylor" (or, on occasion, "My Dear Mr. Taylor") and "Dear Col. Wilgus." By contrast, Governor Wilson began his letters to Taylor with "Dear Jim"; Wilson to Taylor, 8 September 1933; Wilgus to Taylor, 17 August 1934.

[81] Taylor to Nolen, 26 July 1934.

[82] Taylor to Wilgus, 5 November 1934.

[83] "Just a Dream," editorial, *Rutland Daily Herald*, 14 August 1933, 4.

[84] Richard Munson Judd, *The New Deal in Vermont: Its Impact and Aftermath* (New York: Garland, 1979), 87–93.

[85] Samuel B. Hand, conversation with the author, Burlington, Vermont, December 18, 1994.

[86] Taylor to Wilgus, 6 April 1934.

[87] Taylor to Thomas, 13 March 1935.

[88] Taylor to Wilgus, 22 January 1935.

[89] Taylor to Wilgus, 28 February 1935.

[90] Taylor to Wilgus, 6 March 1935.

[91] Taylor to Nolen, 28 March 1935.

[92] "Jas. P. Taylor Is Missing," *Burlington Free Press*, 7 September 1949, sec. 2, 1.

[93] Cowles, conversation with the author.

[94] "Jas. P. Taylor Is Missing"; "Lake Champlain Gives Up Body of J. P. Taylor," *Burlington Free Press*, 12 September 1949, sec. 2, 11.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Future of the Northern Forest

Edited by Christopher McGrory Klyza and Stephen C. Trombulak (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1994, pp. 265, $39.95).

New England's northern forest spreads across 26 million acres of woodland, from the northernmost tip of Maine to the Troy Hill region of Adirondack Park in upper New York. Late in 1982 British financier James Goldsmith finagled a takeover of Diamond International, owner of nearly 1 million acres of land in the four northern forest states. Goldsmith astutely observed that maturing timber had made the sum of Diamond's parts worth more than the whole. Within a short eight months, he recouped most of the $660 million purchase price through sale of the company's separate divisions, leaving him with land worth an estimated $723 million. He then sold large chunks of this land to development groups similarly bent on maximizing return on their investments. Concerned about the potential for overharvesting and other shoddy management practices, various environmental groups and public agencies scrambled to acquire several important tracts, paying a dear price. Fairly stated, however, the events that set the stage for a contest over Diamond's lands had been years, even decades, in the making. Changing patterns of land use, increasingly competitive global timber markets, and spiraling real estate prices fueled by second-home development lay at the roots of a problem that soon pushed its way onto a national political agenda—resulting in the Northern Forest Lands Study, the Northern Forest Lands Council,

and the Forest Legacy Program. Focus on Diamond International and other similar mergers quickly branched into a much larger public policy debate about land use, ecosystem health, taxation of timberlands, private property rights, and public land acquisition.

The Future of the Northern Forest is a thoughtfully conceived and carefully drawn invitation to the larger public to participate in that policy debate. The book is a collection of essays and commentaries representing the many points of view that energize this intense conflict over forest resources. Its editors, Christopher McGrory Klyza and Stephen C. Trombulak, both from Middlebury College, have wisely chosen not to favor one point of view over another but have left that task to the contributing writers, who present their arguments directly to the reader. Each writer conveys a deep sense of caring about the future of this resource, and each presents his or her arguments in clear and readable form. Nevertheless, through keen juxtaposition of opposing points of view—and the book's organization is one of its strong points—the editors force the reader to confront the inescapable conclusion that not all the writers can be correct. Slowly but surely, those readers who remain alert for the fragments of truth that do blaze a reasoned path will be enticed ever more deeply into the forest debate. The tension created by this quest for a trustworthy course—and by the perilous consequences of losing one's way—help to make the book successful. That, and the point upon which all the contributors can agree: that the northern forest is a resource vital to the region's well-being, both present and future.

The problems facing those who would sustain the northern forest are daunting. Yet the editors prove to be capable guides, their skill best revealed through the book's four-part organization and underlying theme of neutrality. An introductory section acquaints readers with the region's natural and cultural history, the latter through the eyes of the Abenaki Nation, and summarizes northern New England's political and economic facts of life. This first segment closes with a superbly placed, almost soothing, examination of ethical concerns by Stephanie Kaza, who teaches environmental studies at the University of Vermont. Kaza writes of choice, consequence, and accountability as means of removing the mask of power that conceals the answers to deadlock in the northern forest. Her essay is one to which readers should return again and again when uncertainty surfaces on the pages that follow. And make no mistake: it will.

Many of the views from the public and private sectors in the book's next two segments also deserve specific mention. They range from the far-reaching vision for a new paradigm of sustainable environments presented by Emily Bateson to observations about a sustainable rural economy made by Jonathon Wood, who argues that "the best way to conserve

the forest is to keep it in the hands of those who use it, understand it, and love it." He may be right, but then what will keep it from falling into the hands of those who satisfy none of these tests? This is but one example of the many vexing questions readers will be forced to ask (some may discover themselves asking these questions out loud). As a rule, each essay is strong and articulate; most, too, succumb to weaknesses of varying significance. Yet the challenge of finding these flaws, many well hidden, is also part of the book's appeal. In a concluding section, the editors pull the issues into sharper focus by isolating points of agreement and disagreement and by recognizing the need for additional studies either to prove or disprove some of the authors' contentions. In so doing, the editors reinforce an earlier point that scientific principles will provide solid grounding for policy.

Naturally, one is tempted to expound on the merits and shortcomings of these many points of view, and of course that is the editors' ultimate goal. To yield to that temptation here, however, is to cross the line of neutrality that makes the book's invitation to the general public so sincere. In truth, the approach the book's editors take warrants particular comment, for it touches upon a difficult question: How does one draw the greater public into debate about important policy matters? The battle for resources is not a new one in this country, nor is it one that will disappear any time soon. Many books have approached such conflicts via an academic path, a method that offers the chance to organize issues carefully and to present the pros and cons of various choices in a balanced and reasoned way. At the same time, such books risk failing to reach the ordinary reader and in so doing fail to tap a potentially powerful source for unraveling stalemate forced by power and self-interest. Other books--such as William MacLeish's 1985 story about conflict on Georges Bank, *Oil and Water*—place the reader in the shoes of those who live at the storm's center. This approach makes for interesting text, but one's thoughts tend to wander from the all-important, energy-consuming, indeed Sisyphean ordeal of bringing entrenched parties to consensus. *Northern Forest* manages to balance some of both strategies, always holding the reader's interest but never losing site of the immense task at hand. A good thing, too. Political attention has provided a shining opportunity to make choices about the future of these important woodlands, and the moment to make those choices is now. Inaction has its own consequences, and we are rapidly losing time.

ROBERT MCCULLOUGH

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Held Captive by Indians: Selected Narratives, 1642–1836

Edited by Richard VanDerBeets (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1994, rev. ed., pp. 414, $18.95).

This revised edition of *Held Captive by Indians,* a work first published more than twenty years ago, testifies to the enduring interest in Indian captivity narratives. A distinctly American literary genre, Indian captivity narratives seem to have offered something for almost every generation: in seventeenth-century New England they served as metaphors for the Puritans' struggle against the devil and the wilderness; in the eighteenth century they provided justification for dispossession and "civilization" of Indian "savages"; in the nineteenth century they could be read as frontier adventure stories; in our own time they have offered glimpses into the lives and cultures of Indian captors and prompted reexamination of gender relations in Indian and colonial societies. VanDerBeets's anthology is geared toward both the scholar and the general reader, and it is good to see it reissued in paperback.

Since *Held Captive by Indians* first appeared, the secondary literature on captivity narratives has flourished. Unfortunately, VanDerBeets's preface to the new edition provides a rather superficial discussion of this literature, for the most part concentrating on the recent interest in women's narratives to justify reissue of a collection that contains the experiences of seven female captives. Several other anthologies of captivity narratives have also appeared. The massive, 112-volume reprint of 311 *Narratives of North American Indian Captivities,* edited by Wilcomb E. Washburn (1975 et seq.), has proved a boon to scholars but is not easily accessible to general readers. Others, such as *Puritans Among the Indians: Accounts of Captivity and Redemption, 1676–1724,* carefully edited and annotated by Alden T. Vaughan and Edward W. Clark (1981), concentrate (as VanDerBeets points out) on a particular region of the country. Some of the narratives in *Held Captive by Indians*—Mary Rowlandson's account, for example—have now been reprinted many times and will strike anyone interested in the subject as pretty standard fare. Other selections, such as those by Robert Eastburn and Charles Johnston, are less readily available but in some ways just as valuable. VanDerBeets's assertion that his collection offers examples "from the Eastern woodlands to the Southeast, the Plains, and the Southwest" (p. xv) is somewhat misleading. In fact, the volume is out of balance: almost all the accounts come from the Northeast, two involve Cherokees (i.e., the Southeast), and only Rachel

Plummer's description of her time among the Comanches comes from the nineteenth century and from west of the Mississippi (i.e., the Plains and the Southwest).

While the volume is useful as is, the editor and publisher could have done more to bring it up-to-date and to make the revised edition a contribution in its own right. The introduction, excellent when it was first published in 1973, now seems a tad dated because it fails to address the new directions in captivity scholarship. Placing the map of Plummer's travels alongside her narrative rather than in the previous chapter also seems an obvious correction that should have been made. Although I recognize the financial constraints that dictate reissuing the volume with only minimal changes and with additions confined to a brief preface, a more thoroughgoing revision would have helped the book hold its place in the now extensive literature on captivity narratives.

COLIN G. CALLOWAY

Colin G. Calloway is associate professor of history at the University of Wyoming, editor of North Country Captives: Selected Narratives of Indian Captivity from Vermont and New Hampshire, *and author of* The Western Abenakis of Vermont, 1600–1800 *and* The American Revolution in Indian Country.

The Mortal Presidency: Illness and Anguish in the White House

By Robert E. Gilbert (New York: Basic Books, 1992, pp. 331, $25.00).

Serving as president of the United States is hazardous to your health. Two-thirds of our former presidents died before achieving their life expectancy. Four were assassinated, and others barely survived assassination attempts. Another four died in office "of illnesses that were likely job-related" (p. 233); nonfatal physical and psychological ailments have incapacitated several. Robert E. Gilbert, a political scientist at Northeastern University, has written *The Mortal Presidency* to diagnose the extent and inevitability of presidential infirmity and to prescribe a better way to deal with it.

After calculating the life expectancies and ages of death of presidents from George Washington through Lyndon Johnson (omitting those who were assassinated), Gilbert concluded that despite their having access to medical attention not available to the average white male, twenty-one

of the deceased presidents up to 1992 failed to reach their individual life expectancies. (Congressmen and Supreme Court justices, incidentally, are likely to exceed their life expectancies.) Possible explanations for this phenomenon are varied and complex, but two likely factors are the stress of office and the personal characteristics common to individuals who compete for the presidency.

Although Gilbert provides arithmetic means and medians to suggest a mathematical precision to his analysis, his "statistics" are less persuasive than his narrative. The most obvious reason for this is that figuring in Richard Nixon and subsequent former presidents still living significantly reduces the mean and median of the collective differentials between presidential life expectancy and age at death. Nonetheless, the author's basic premise on the hazards to presidential health is well taken and explored in detail in separate chapters on Calvin Coolidge, Franklin Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan. Readers of *Vermont History* will probably find the chapter on Coolidge the most interesting and certainly the most controversial.

By Gilbert's calculations Coolidge died more prematurely than any president except those assassinated. More significant, however, is the author's assertion that Coolidge was psychologically unfit to serve as president throughout his second term. This analysis, which appeared in an earlier form as an article in *Political Psychology,* maintains that the death of Calvin Jr. was the last in a series of deaths (his mother, sister, and stepmother) "that combined to produce in [Coolidge] a profound psychological vulnerability that made it impossible for him to transcend his grief after his son's death and thus destroyed his presidency" (p. 20).

Gilbert bases his conclusions on Coolidge's public statements and the contrast in his work habits before and after Cal Jr.'s tragic death. He depicts lethargic Cal as a once forceful workaholic paralyzed by the loss of his son. The author places less emphasis on cardiovascular disease, from which Coolidge eventually died, to explain his energy loss. Noting the president's worry "over the possibility" of heart disease, Gilbert says that Coolidge "insisted on having two electrocardiograms taken every day" (p. 40) and took his own pulse regularly. President Coolidge may well, as Gilbert suggests, have been a hypochondriac, but he had good cause to be so.

The principal contribution of *The Mortal Presidency* is to stimulate concern with the chief executive's health—an issue on which presidents and their physicians have frequently conspired to deceive the public, often to the detriment of the nation.

SAMUEL B. HAND

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Railroads of Vermont: A Pictorial

By Robert C. Jones (Shelburne, Vt.: New England Press, 1994, pp. 355, $60.00).

Surely there can be no greater authority on the railroad industry in Vermont than Robert C. Jones, coauthor of a book on the state granite industry railways and author of a six-volume work on the Central Vermont Railroad and, most recently, the remarkable *Railroads of Vermont*, his illustrated history of the fifty-five companies that ran passenger, freight, or commuter trolley service at some time during the past 150 years. (The first volume was reviewed in the winter 1994 issue, the second in the spring 1994 issue of *Vermont History*.)

Like a heavily laden freight engine throttling down as it approaches Montpelier, Jones developed a great deal of momentum during his two-volume journey. It was, in fact, difficult to stop collecting anecdotes and photographs. Fortunately, his publisher agreed to issue a third book to showcase what was left out—and the result is a solid, original work that can stand on its own. Nowhere does one get the impression of surplus. The photographs in this predominantly illustrated book are as fascinating as those Jones collected previously. The texts on each of the forty railroads he examines are condensations of those in the earlier versions: the anecdotes are to be found in Jones's fine caption work, as valuable an augmentation to the narratives as before.

Although there are tens of thousands of rail enthusiasts and historians who will never tire of examining photographs of rolling stock and plumes of smoke, not everyone is so fascinated with the hardware. This pictorial volume offers a multitude of railroad engines chuffing across the Vermont landscape, but it is balanced with fascinating, valuable nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century views of many qualities of old Vermont now irretrievably gone. An open trolley car rumbles down Merchants Row in downtown Rutland, toward the fairgrounds, as a man hustles to board it. The cruel wreckage of the Green Mountain Flyer, after a head-on collision in 1920, is scattered over the mud and snow on the embankment: "Poor penmanship on the train orders," we are told, "resulted in the orders being misread" (p. 245). The trim, ornate little Memphremagog steamboat *Lady of the Lake*, at dockside in Newport, awaits passengers from the connecting Connecticut & Passumpsic Rivers Railroad sometime during the Grant administration. The delightful little depot in Putney stands in its High Victorian Gothic style before it burned, gingerbready bargeboard and all. Rows of doughboys returning from Europe in 1919 march

up from the Newport station past a row of flag-bedecked frame buildings. A gleaming little trolley sits at the Burlington Traction Company's car barn in the 1920s; its cowcatcher looks about as substantial as bedsprings, and a poster advertising Lillian Gish's new film, *Way Down East,* is affixed to it. The Connecticut River engulfs the streets of Bellows Falls during the great flood of 1927. If every picture tells a story, there are hundreds in this absorbing book.

Railroads of Vermont: A Pictorial is recommended not only for rail enthusiasts but for anyone interested in Vermontiana—the illustrations help document Vermont's industrial, architectural, cultural, and topographical history. All three volumes by Jones would seem indispensable to any library's local history collection. An index in the present volume is organized according to town and village citation.

DAVID HAWARD BAIN

David Haward Bain is the author of Empire Express: Building the First Transcontinental Railroad *(forthcoming);* Whose Woods These Are *(1993), a history of Vermont's Bread Loaf Writers' Conference; and* Sitting in Darkness: Americans in the Philippines *(1984), recipient of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Book Award. He teaches writing at Middlebury College.*

Confessions of a Vermont Realtor (An Optimistic Retrospective)

By Robert P. Murray (Barre, Vt.: Northlight Studio Press, [1994], pp. 246, $12.60).

What a Way to Live and Make a Living: The Lyman P. Wood Story

By Roger Griffith (Charlotte, Vt.: In Brief Press, 1994, pp. 259, $19.95).

How-to books have long been a part of American education. People longing for love or an improved golf swing read advice manuals and instructional tracts with a confidence rivaled only by the boosting spirit of the experts they consult. Never mind the obviously secular, even banal air that sometimes distinguishes these books; they all presume a belief in self-improvement (dare I say *perfectibility*) that is almost religious.

The most ambitious of such books—for instance, Dale Carnegie's nearly sixty-year-old *How to Win Friends and Influence People,* which has become the basis for public speaking classes and corporate training programs—strive to effect a wholesale transformation of self. And though their promise that "you can be better" often means "you can be richer," the exhortation is of a piece with more consciously philosophical efforts to define the good life.

Robert P. Murray's *Confessions of a Vermont Realtor* and *What a Way to Live and Make a Living,* which (despite the single-author byline) is cowritten by Roger Griffith and Lyman P. Wood, assume these metaphysical duties with grace and humor. Both books make for entertaining, even enlightening reading; both take special interest in portraying Vermont as an ideal place to live. The longer and more substantive of the two, *What a Way to Live,* tells the story of Lyman P. Wood, a philosopher-of-all-trades whose successful mail-order businesses through the years have made him a Vermont legend (in the appendix is a proclamation from Governor Howard Dean declaring June 17, 1993, "Lyman Wood Day"). For Griffith and Wood, biography is the occasion for explaining how anyone with common sense and just a little capital can establish a thriving business. Yet lest anyone dream of becoming the next Donald Trump, this practical advice comes wrapped in idealism. A utopian planner in the Jeffersonian tradition—and vehemently antiurban—Wood is less interested in showing people how to get rich than in promoting the benefits of rural autonomy and small-scale economic endeavors. From the jacket photo featuring a snug, well-gardened homestead to the central points summarized—and summarized again—at the end of each chapter, *What a Way to Live* is simultaneously charming and cranky.

Confessions of a Vermont Realtor also revolves around flatlanders' searching for better lives in Vermont. Murray, like Wood, began his career as a New York adman but grew sick of city hassles and in the 1950s headed for the ski slopes of Stowe, where he eventually found himself selling property to fellow out-of-staters attracted to the beauties of Vermont. As the title suggests, *Confessions* is a highly personal account of the real estate business in Vermont. Sometimes the personal perspective wears thin (as when Murray chronicles his romantic exploits), but his down-to-earth descriptions of Vermont's real estate industry are frequently engaging. Equally appealing is his implicit endorsement of Golden Rule business practices. After reading of Murray's efforts to help his customers experience the pleasures of Vermont life, prospective home buyers may well want to coax him out of retirement.

To judge from these books, traditional New England values appear to be alive and well in Vermont. And so perhaps they are. Certainly, the

possibility of yoking individual ambition to communitarian ideals informs the vision of the good life described by Murray and Wood alike. But in staking out the moral high ground of market culture, these accounts also raise questions about the limits of idealism. For instance, despite their implicit stand against economic growth, these authors remain in principle pro-business, even pro-development. Indeed, a skeptic would point out that many of Murray's wealthy flatlanders made their money by pushing economic development in other states. By the same token, Wood's mail-order schemes, which aggressively target consumers' "dreams" (Wood first found success during the depression by selling rabbits' feet and prayers), thrive by extending the market through the postal service. At bottom the Vermont these two men envision remains dependent on, and prey to, the fluctuations of the economic world outside the Green Mountain State.

The fate of Wood's highly successful Garden Way enterprise (which by 1981 was doing more than $100 million in sales) is a case in point. As Wood's venture grew beyond expectations, in part because of sales of a Rototiller manufactured in Troy, New York, the out-of-state natives grew restless. Why, they wondered, should the Vermont employees of Garden Way realize their dreams of small-scale prosperity while they did the dirty work? Wood was forced out of the business. For Vermonters accustomed to purchasing clothing, seeds, and even tennis balls from out-of-state vendors, the problem deserves scrutiny. In a global market in which American manufacturers search out cheap labor in impoverished places that bear little resemblance to the ideal New England landscape, buying Jefferson's dream frequently has hidden costs.

TIMOTHY B. SPEARS

Timothy B. Spears is assistant professor of American literature and civilization at Middlebury College and author of 100 Years on the Road: The Traveling Salesman in American Culture.

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Recent Additions to the Vermont Historical Society Library

BOOKS

*Berkshire Historical Society, *History of Berkshire.* Berkshire, Vt.: Berkshire Historical Society, 1994. 155p. List: $32.95.

*Carpenter, Jonathan, *Jonathan Carpenter's Journal: Being the Diary of a Revolutionary War Soldier and Pioneer Settler of Vermont.* Transcribed and edited by Miriam Herwig and Wes Herwig. Randolph Center, Vt.: Greenhills Books, 1994. 143p. List: $25.00. Transcription of a diary in the collection of the Vermont Historical Society.

Carter, Colin H., *From Vietnam and Beyond.* Barre, Vt.: The author, 1995. 29p. Source: The author, 141 Fairview St., Barre, VT 05641-4717. List: Unknown (paper). Poetry about the Vietnam War and its effects on the author, a Vermonter.

*Fish, Charles, *In Good Hands: The Keeping of a Family Farm.* New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1995. 229p. List: $21.00. Life on a Rutland, Vermont, farm in the 1940s.

Fisher, John R., *Lewis Barttro: A Vermont Franco-American in the Civil War.* Burlington: The author, 1994. Unpaginated. Source: The author, 1595 North Ave., Burlington, VT 05401-2433. List: Unknown (spiral bound). Vermonter born Louis Berthiaume.

*Hewitt, Mary-Jo, *The Biscuit Basket Lady: Recipes from a Vermont Kitchen.* New York: Hearst Books; 1995. 209p. List: $17.00.

*Lord, Gary T., *Norwich University.* Louisville, Ky.: Harmony House, 1995. 112p. List: $47.95.

*Robinson, Charles A., *Vermont Cabinetmakers and Chairmakers Before 1855: A Checklist.* Shelburne, Vt.: Shelburne Museum, 1994. 126p. List: $14.95 (paper).

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Cohen, Janie, "Hilda Belcher: A Realist Rediscovered," *American Art Review* 6, 4 (1994): 90–97, 159.

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Fisher, John R., comp., *Desany Family History.* Burlington: The compiler, 1990. Unpaginated. Source: The compiler, 1595 North Ave., Burlington, VT 05401-2433. List: Unknown (spiral bound).

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Rodgers, Robert H., comp., *The Family of Cyrus Leach and Mary Burritt (Hawley) Leach of Fairfield and Fairfax, Vermont.* New Haven, Vt.: The compiler, 1994. 100p. Source: The compiler, RR 1, Box 201, New Haven, VT 05472. List: Unknown (paper).

Welch, Linda Margaret Farr, *Families of Cavendish: The Early Settlers of the Black River Valley in Windsor County, Vermont; a Social and Genealogical History,* vol. 1. Cavendish, Vt.: Cavendish Historical Society, 1994. 346p. Source: Cavendish Historical Society, P.O. Box 472, Cavendish, VT 05142. List: $30.00 (paper).

*indicates books available through the Vermont Historical Society bookshop.

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